

January 19, 1972

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Christmas Eve 1968. I worked at Rand putting together copies of the options paper for Kissinger, to be taken to New York the next day. Also saw my children and Yvonne back at my house briefly and then went back to work.

Christmas Day - left Los Angeles for New York along with Henry Rowan and Fred Ikle, head of the social science division. We checked into the Hotel Pierre that night. I have a listing of room 1232 though that may not have been my room but somebody else's.

December 26th. We all had breakfast with Henry Kissinger at the Pierre and I discussed among other things the use that McNamara had made in 1961 of the device of setting a long list of difficult questions to be answered with short deadlines to the various departments of the Department of Defense. This had revealed to them that he had in his own head or in the minds of the people working for him a good grasp of the difficult or embarrassing problems on which controversy existed, so that the services would be less inclined to try to snow him or present him with a united front on a question which was actually controversial. So by giving them questions they could answer truthfully only with great embarrassment, he established a moral supremacy over them. And finally he did elicit a great deal of information and stimulated new thinking purporting to instituting some new approaches. I suggested that these could be applied to the national security machinery as a whole, from the position in the White House and Kissinger seemed interested. Later the paper which we discussed with him that day on options had a section in it laying out matters which were ^{conflicts} "within the bureaucracy". Kissinger felt squeamish being in the position of characterizing divergent positions in the bureaucracy before he had ever dealt with them directly himself so he asked that that section be separated and put in the form of questions to be answered by the various agencies. I did prepare a list of about 20 questions and he asked me

to expand it. I took the list back to Rand, asked for suggestions (although I got only a few I was able to use), and sent the expanded list finally. He proceeded to send it out as National Security Study Memorandum 1 (NSSM1), with the directive that each agency should give its own answers to all questions without coordinating the answers.

Meanwhile on the 26th and 27th and the morning of the 28th I worked with Kissinger on the options, leaving behind a slightly edited version of this first draft. Mort Halperin turned up on the 26th and 27th and Tom Shelling was there for one morning, I believe the morning of the 27th. At that time Kissinger's only personal aide was Eagleberger, who later had a nervous breakdown from overwork and left the staff.

Among the disputes that took place over the original draft was Tom Shelling's feeling that no option had been included that purported to tell the President how he could win the war. I argued strongly that no such option existed in reality. I said it would be possible to destroy the people of North Vietnam, for example, but even that could not be described as a victory for our aims in Vietnam. In any case, if anything survived at all, it would probably be the control structure of the Lao Dong party, which would operate from Laos or China if necessary.

Shelling thought that there should also be more discussion on the impact of the possible threat of escalation as well as escalation itself. ^{None of} ~~All~~ this was said by Shelling in the spirit of advocating one or another of these. I did agree to put in a section pointing out the threat of escalation as a distinct option, although pointing out that it seemed unlikely that any threat would have any effects that the actual bombing had failed to have in the years under Johnson.

Kissinger's concern was ^{that} "without a threat of escalation there is no basis for ^{negotiation} ~~escalation~~". I claimed on the contrary that the threat of escalation had never given us bargaining

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power any more than the practice of escalation had, and that the only threat that might impress the other side would be deescalation; that is, it would involve going down to a level that could be sustained in terms of American domestic politics over an indefinite period by virtue of low costs, relatively small U.S. presence, and very low U.S. casualties. This new position would be the basis for the threat to stay indefinitely if certain face saving terms were not met. This is, of course, essentially what Nixon did do, although he has combined it with both threat and frequent practice of demonstrative escalation of the war over North Vietnam and the expansion of the war into Laos and Cambodia, features designed apparently to reduce the risk of maintaining a small U.S. force in South Vietnam but not only greatly increasing the costs of doing so in terms of domestic dissent, but I would judge having very little effect on those risks. The extrication strategy designed by Conrad Kellen, Langer, Hordelick, and Gertoff and Hoeffding. Another disagreement was that Kissinger was concerned that there was any mention of a unilateral withdrawal option. "Why is that in, why mention it at all?" he asked.

I got ⁱⁿ included on the grounds that if another strategy which might look better had tried and failed to succeed, this strategy would then have to be considered, or followed. So it would be well to look at it closely at this point before choosing any of the others. He reluctantly allowed it to be included on that basis, explaining in a preface, "No official of the Government currently recommends such a proposal, but it could become relevant if others were tried and failed."

It should be remembered that the strategy so stigmatized is the policy endorsed eventually by a majority, 73%, of the American people. The one major difference between this draft which went to the President-elect and to his appointees, Rogers and Laird, and the second draft by Fred Ikle which eventually went to the first meeting of the National Security

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Council, was that this last option was dropped. As I understand what happened, General Goodpasteur, who had been called back from Vietnam to comment on these options and other things, did provide comments on each of the other options. He said of this extrication option, "There's no need for me to say anything about this one, it's not a military option," which I take it he said with some contempt and a clear indication of how the military would treat any prospect that any unilateral withdrawal would be taken seriously by politicians. ^{Kissinger} He thereupon asked Ikle if he would mind removing that option from the list and he did so.

It was just this sort of byplay that had made me dubious in the beginning as to whether we ought to undertake what amounted to direct staff work for Kissinger at Rand, since we were now in the position of collaborating upon a definition of the range of alternatives which in fact excluded an important possibility, indeed, the only possibility which guaranteed our withdrawal from Vietnam. As it was, all of the options presented to the National Security Council involved the possibility of staying in Vietnam, with our extrication being contingent upon policies followed either by Hanoi, Saigon, or both.

December 28th. I believe on the afternoon of the 28th I flew to Chicago for a meeting of the American Economic Association. I stayed at the Palmer House.

December 29th. I was a discussant at 3:30 of a paper at one of the sessions. I returned to Santa Monica, I believe the 31st of December.

January 16th, 1969. I went to Vale, Colorado, for skiing with John Sack. Yvonne was with me. I stayed there about a week. The calendar doesn't reveal much for the next two weeks. Earl Ravannah arrived for two days at Rand to be interviewed as an employee. There's mention of work on Hanoi options, which I think Konrad Kellen and some others

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undertook to do to parallel the work on our options to be done also for Kissinger. During this period I had expanded the questions and given them to Kissinger.

February 7th. Hoang Van Chi, author of "From Colonialism to Communism," arrived at Rand. I don't remember if this was his first visit. This was to discuss work on the Hanoi options with Kellen and others.

February 8th (I believe): John Van^o arrived in the country. He called from the airport and got me at work. It seems more likely he arrived on Friday February 7th. His first words were "Hello, this is John Van^o"; I said "Hi, this is Dan". He said "Did you have anything to do with some questions that we just got out in Vietnam?" Later he told me that all of the deputies for pacification or revolutionary development from the four corp^s areas had been called together in Saigon to put together on a crash basis answers on the questions sent out for NSSM1.

They read the questions at the table and then began to go around the table commenting on them. When it came around to John, he said, "Gentlemen, the important question is not how do we answer these questions but who wrote these questions?" He said, "I know of only two men in Washington who have the depth of knowledge to have written these questions, Dan Ellsberg and Ed Lansdale." Incidentally, when I recently talked to him on his latest arrival he told me that when the news that the Pentagon Papers reached Saigon our mutual friend Ed ^{Bingham} Bukharder called him in ^{II Corps} ----- from Saigon, and ~~had~~ read the headlines and said, "Who do you suppose had^s done this?" To which John answered, "You know goddamn well who did it."

Chi seems to have been at Rand all of that week of the 10th to the 16th. By February 18th I was back in Washington, possibly the 17th, having been requested by Mort Halperin to take charge of summaries of the answers to the questions which were now beginning to come in from the various agencies,

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since I was the person who had designed the questions and knew more about the answers than anyone else.

February 19th. I had breakfast with Henry Rowan at the Madison, and lunch with Frank Wizner at the Metropolitan Club.

February 20th. I had lunch at the Occidental Restaurant with Ed Stillman and that evening was at a party which I believe was a pre-wedding party for Frank Wizner given by Henry Brandon. I remember Brandon, who later wrote a book called the Anatomy of Error about the escalation which benefitted very obviously from input from Robert McNamara, who was his friend. The book revealed a great many things which until that point had been secret, things about the decision process. I remember Brandon saying that McNamara had told him he felt his greatest mistake had been the recommendation to go for an open ended commitment in July of 1965, a decision which called for the immediate ^{order} descending of 100,000 troops by the end of 1965 with the expectation it would be followed by another 100,000 in the following year. This was described to the public only as involving 50,000 men and more when and if needed.

Between the 23rd and 27th John Van was in Washington. During this period I was monitoring the answers which had been farmed out to various people on the NSC staff, a dozen of them in all, since something like a thousand pages of answers had been received with separate answers coming from State, the Embassy, CIA, JCS, MACV, ISA in the Pentagon, and in some cases separate answers from EAPB in State and the intelligence part of State.

Halperin was also looking for someone to work full time on the war in Vietnam for Kissinger, and I had ^{for a} Luc Serris come over on the 19th of February to talk to Halperin. On Monday the 24th I had ^{Ev Bunker} Ed Bunker talk to him. On the evening of the 24th Frank Wizner, Frank Fitzgerald, and Natalie Kuhn, all three of us having been in Vietnam together. Van attended that party, as did nearly everyone

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else we knew in Vietnam. This was also attended by Ward Just, who was intrigued to find me in Washington. He asked me what I was doing. I was quite vague about it and apparently he followed up on his curiosity by asking many other people at the party (all of whom were friends of mine). Some who worked in the State Department, like Charlie Cook and Jerry Britten, were able to tell him something of what I was doing. On the assumption that he too was a personal friend and on his indication that he already knew a great deal, he was able to add bits of information from one person to more information from others and eventually *pieced out* a good deal of the nature of NSSM1. I had both authored the questions and was now working on the answers.

February 25. Van gave a talk at Foreign Service Institute which I attended, discovering in passing that several old memos of mine were given as background material to all these students who were being trained for service in Vietnam.

At noon Van and I had lunch with Tran Van Chung, the *former* Ambassador from Vietnam under Diem. Then, I think that afternoon or the next day, I became aware from some of my friends that Ward Just did intend to write a piece about what I was doing. I was very concerned about this, since Kissinger had placed very great emphasis on the fact that no one should know that Rand had done staff work for him. He seemed especially sensitive that I was in charge, since I was a known dove.

I felt that if Just's column came out I would be regarded as the leak for it, or at best would be seen as being indiscrete *et* in telling anyone what I was doing who had then proceeded to tell Ward Just. I felt that this would doom any further relationship with Rand and Kissinger, thus embarrassing my own relations with Henry Rowan. So I was quite upset about this. I called Just. He said he had gotten this story entirely on his own and couldn't quash it. He also denied flatly that he had gotten certain

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friends to confirm information that he told them he had gotten directly from John Van. Rather, he told me that he had gotten certain information from John Van which he had used to get further information out of other people.

Later when John was over in the Executive Building I had him call Just and I listened in on the other phone. John said to Just, "You know I didn't tell you anything about Dan's doing this," to which Just then answered, "Of course not, of course not, you didn't say anything about it." But Van put a very heavy pitch to it that it would be against the interest of the nation if this indiscretion should bar me from work and keep Rand from working as a consultant.

Van said, "I know how Dan feels because I could be just as easily embarrassed as he could. Today I was giving a lecture at the FSI that ----- another reporter attended, and although it was off the record if he were to quote me directly I would be blown out of the water." Ward hung up.

Van explained to me that it had been his intention to suggest to Just that other story as an alternative one. Just told me when I called him again, ^{that} I had very concerned friends, ^{and} that he decided not to use the piece. And the next day, sure enough, he had gone to the other reporter and gotten the story Van had indicated to him. He printed great chunks of Van's address to the FSI, without mentioning Van by name, but in a way which made the source unmistakable.

February 27th. Had dinner with Halperin.

March 3rd. I seem to have seen Ted Kennedy at 4:30, possibly Gelb in the evening.

March 4th. I returned Tuesday, but according to the affidavit at Rand that was the day I picked up at the Rand office a satchel full of the Pentagon Papers to bring back to Rand on my courier pass. Just before

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leaving on the 3rd or 4th I wrote a series of Draft NSSM's and NSAM, the new formulas NSDM's decision memorandum for the followup uncertainties that remain from the various questions. Winston Lord, ^{now Kissinger's ad} Halperin, and then Halperin's assistant, had done a draft of a summary of all the answers. I worked over that draft with them, and made a number of changes in it, which he accepted.

At some point, perhaps Friday the 28th or maybe March 1st I had copied a great deal, essentially all, of the answers to be studied at Rand. Halperin asked that I not do that, that I not take back any of this material, which I interpreted as meaning he did not want to be officially informed and might prefer that I actually not do it. And that in any case, if I should do it, it should be handled unusually discretely^{et} back at Rand.

So when I brought the copies back, I believe I had two copies, I put one copy into the system and called a meeting of all the people who had worked on options and those interested in Vietnam. I described to them the circumstances under which I had gotten this and Mort had said it was not to be copied and brought back to Rand. I thus urged everyone to be very silent about the fact that Rand did have this. I kept one copy in my safe and the other copy was distributed fairly widely to people who did understand that it was under the counter.

I have a note of the meeting in the Economics Conferenceroom on Vietnam questions on Friday, March 7th. That may have been the day when I discussed with this group of people at Rand the circumstances under which we had gotten these answers. Also there was a meeting with General Walt of the Marine Corps at Rand at 11:00 a.m. Walt had been my basic training commander in the Marines and then most recently had been the head of the Marines ^{in I Corps}.

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There's very little indication in my calendar of the next weeks. On Friday I gave a seminar to the economics department about politics in Vietnam. On Friday May 2 I saw Adam ^{a.i.} Wolensky at the Bradley for Mayor, ^{Hedgkott,} having rounded up some people at Rand in the proceeding few days to help Bradley out on policy issues. A note May 21st says that Eqbal Ahmad was in town, though I don't recall that. A note with a question mark says Pat arrives 6:30 for a couple of days. It was the first time I had seen her for several years, three years.

During the Spring, April and May, I was now working very hard simultaneously writing papers which I labelled Notes on Vietnam at Rand. I ^{had} realized ^{that} by a few ^{interpolations} indentations on my handwritten steno note pad notes, they could be turned into drafts on a number of subjects, including my conversations with Vu Van Thai and with ^o Huang Van Chi. Some other subjects, too; that a great many drafts could be generated just by going over my notes. So I was working quite steadily day after day on what amounted to 200 pages of drafts for a couple of months, working mainly at home. May 25th. I flew to Ann Arbor for a conference on ^{Bayesian} Basion Decision Theory where I saw Kirby Hall and Don Hall. Then on the 27th of May I flew to Columbus, Ohio, where Richard Minear had invited me to give two lectures to his seminar on Vietnam. At the same time I was reading in the Pentagon Papers, although that was done entirely at work. I had given some of the copies to Henry Rowan to look over so those were in his safe. The rest were all in my safe in the bottom drawer. I had an understanding with Jan Butler that all the material I was checked out with was in the top drawer, so she was willing discretely not to look in the bottom drawer. In any case, she didn't look. When she was checking my inventory she would just look at the

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top drawer, things I was checked out with.

In my lectures in Columbus on the evening of May 27th and the morning of May 28th I had an insight which later had considerable effect on me. There were about 100 students in the class who listened respectfully to what I had to say, but it seemed to me were fairly cool although our attitudes of policy seemed to be similar. I thought this over during the evening of the 27th and the next morning checked out a hypothesis as to why they were reserved toward me. I asked for a show of hands as to how many believed that a majority of the South Vietnamese people would prefer Viet Cong as their rulers to the GVN. Apparently all raised their hands. Then I asked how many believed that the majority in South Vietnam preferred the Viet Cong to any possible rulers. Again virtually all raised their hands.

I told them, "You may be right. The true attitudes of the Vietnamese people are unclear to any Americans," that it was even possible they were right. "But," I said, "I don't think so, and I want to describe the situation that I think really does obtain and what follows from that." I went on to talk about a model of attitudes implying about 20% supporting the VC, about 20% supporting the GVN, and 60% with an antipathy towards both sides.

I wanted to make a point that that model too would lead to pretty much the same policy prescription for the U.S. in that it would indicate that we would have very little success in defeating the VC, and at the same time that we had no right to be interfering in the politics of the country. It was clear to me that this difference in their perception and my own accounted for a considerable difference in moral outrage over the situation. If one thought as they did that nearly everyone in Vietnam actually preferred the Viet Cong, then our violent intervention was nothing short of outrageous.

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I decided to pass on this datum about academic attitudes to other people who might be addressing academic audiences like Mort Halperin, so he could be prepared for the attitudes that prevailed as late as 1969. But then I thought of the import of another judgment that I had made during the course of the same lectures, namely that the great majority did prefer peace or an end to the fighting under either side, the Viet Cong or the GVN, to a continuation of the war. It suddenly occurred to me for the first time that the moral implications of that judgment for our intervention were essentially the same as for the judgment that they actually preferred the Viet Cong.

So as soon as I got back to Rand I called Mort Halperin at the White House and asked him in his opinion what fraction would prefer peace under the Viet Cong to a continuation of the war; he said about 90%. I said, "What do you think your boss Henry Kissinger would say?" He didn't know but he probably thought about the same. Then I asked him could he possibly justify continuing the war another day against the wishes of the people. He agreed that was a difficult question to answer.

I would say that it was from about this point on that I began to see the war as intolerable, as to be stopped urgently.

Another issue that had kept me earlier from adopting the policy of immediate unilateral withdrawal had been the hope that negotiation might produce an agreement on mutual withdrawal, and that this seemed better from every point of view. However, by about this time it was clear from the newspapers and from what Mort told me that there was no prospect whatever of mutual withdrawal. The question was what option do you go to if mutual withdrawal were not feasible, and to me unilateral withdrawal was the only fallback position. Others at Rand I knew believed that the alternative to mutual withdrawal was an indefinite stay

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with a reduced presence of U.S. troops in cost, that is, the Vietnamization program that Nixon actually chose. But it is clear to me that by the beginning of the summer this meant a policy of indefinite bombing of South Vietnam by the U.S., to which unilateral and quick withdrawal was preferable whatever its consequences would be. Meanwhile during this period negotiation was going on.

There are matters that don't show up in my notes, namely the prospect of ^{Jim Ngoc} Trong Chau coming to this country. He had sent word that he wanted Rand or someone else to sponsor his visit, and Rand had proven willing to do this. The other was the prospect of my going to Vietnam myself. This needed a request. If the request had been initiated from our end it would have taken weeks or months, but I could be cleared for the visit immediately if I was requested by Ambassador Colby, and Van was working on that. We were trying to coordinate these two visits, since I didn't want to go to Vietnam while Chau was over here and there was some question as to when Chau would come.

Meanwhile it had come out that in the course of this Chau was in some trouble because of the arrest of his brother, who confessed to being a North Vietnamese intelligence officer, something of which Van and I had known for some time. I had sent Chau a wire inviting him as the guest of Rand to discuss pacification, I said if this were cleared by everyone. The embassy there was apparently very upset that I had sent him a wire. I didn't know it, but apparently every wire sent over the regular commercial channels would be copied and sent all over the Vietnamese government, and inasmuch as Chau at that point had come out for negotiations they were afraid this would seem an official endorsement of his views by the U.S. Government, especially, as they said in a letter to me, since Rand was suspected widely as a CIA front in Vietnam, apparently because of the police in connection with the prisoner interrogation study.

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They also said it would be unwise to invite Chau now because of the questions raised about his brother. So we sent the word back that the invitation was cancelled, since both the desk officer at State and the Embassy concurred that they would prefer that he not be invited at this time. Their attitude was that when this blew over, which would be a matter of months, that there would then be no problem in his coming.

Meanwhile I had gone ahead on my plans for coming to Vietnam, and I had gotten all my shots and my passport ready. But at the last minute, apparently after Colby had already approved my coming, this was reversed on the advice of my old friend George ^{Jacobson} Jackson, his aid^e, ostensibly because they would be sticking their necks out by inviting me since I was already known as a public critic of the war. It would be all right if I could come under my own or Arpa auspices, but that they should not have the responsibility of inviting me. Actually, as Van informed me, Jake was still sore at me because of a misunderstanding, a personal misunderstanding that had never gotten cleared up. So at the last minute my trip to Vietnam was cancelled.

June 18th. There was a conference on Research on Intelligence, which I addressed, at Rand.

Sometime between June 13 and 22, Janecki^a was visiting me in Malibu on her way to a visit in India. On June 24, Ed Mitchell gave a talk at Rand, Viet Cong Control and Inequality of land holding." This may have been the last time Tony Russo attended Rand as a consultant, participating both in Mitchell's talk on Tuesday the 24th and another on the 25th where criticisms on Mitchell's work were presented.

June 27th, Friday. Francis Doolan^b and Dr. Wu both visited Rand to monitor work that was being done for ISA, since they were both new in ISA. On Friday afternoon I briefed Dolan at length on Vietnam, and that evening there was a dinner at Jim Digby's for Dr. Wu. Wu, incidentally, had been

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a Chinese nationalist citizen until quite recently and had been persuaded to take up U.S. citizenship so that he could do work on government contracts at the ^{Hosen} Over Institute ^{Way and} for Peace. He apparently was a Chinese nationalist citizen from every point of view, and right-wing; thus it was ironic ^{that he was} now as deputy assistant in the same slot that Henry Rowan and later Mort Halperin ^{had held} since this involved all the clearances in the Government, and as Digby Rowan and I agreed that the Chinese nationalist government on Taiwan had access to all of the secrets of our Government.

July 8. I briefed Jerry Sullivan of ARPA.

July 15. I briefed Byobrow on my work and on the lessons of Vietnam. At this point, of course, I had quite a number of drafts: 9, of notes on Vietnam, with the expectation of doing about as many more before I put them together.

Since I didn't go to Vietnam I went instead to the War Resister's League International Conference at the invitation of Janachi. Through her the conference had asked me to present a paper, but I said that since I was new to the subject it would be presumptuous for me to lead a session. I had expected to have Rand pay for that trip, my travel expenses, inasmuch as it dealt with revolution, the subject of my work, but just shortly before that Fulbright had been very critical of the fact that one of the research organizations had done a paper on Ghandian pacifist methods, which he regarded as having nothing to do with defense research. Although I disagreed with that judgment, rather than cause Rand embarrassment I told Harry Rowan I would pay for the trip myself. He was relieved.

I just missed a visit by Robert Thompson during that same period. It was in this conference that I met Bob Eaton very briefly; he went to jail the next day for two years; ~~at which time~~ while he was being sentenced I participated in my first vigil, outside the Post Office Building in Philadelphia. I also met Randy Keeler and his wife,

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Jane Shulman, Paster Niem^{er}ler, Bert Wallrich, and of course Janacki was there with her husband Gerhardt, whom I met for the first time.

Although it doesn't show on my calendar, I remember that I went from Haverford down to Washington, where among other things I picked up the last documents to bring back to Rand. I believe I did that on the 2d of September, Tuesday, the day after Labor Day. *Aug?*

The next relevant entry is for September 18, to see ~~Randy~~ Landon Keller, et al. I'm not sure if this was the first visit with this group to discuss what became the Rand letter but it might have been. *get chron.*

September 23. I had a meeting with Charlie Wolff to discuss a schedule ----- for my book.

26th September, Friday. I drove to Palo Alto, or flew, to attend a session at the Institute of Nonviolence led by Bert Wallach and Ann Gilfoyle. I spent the night there.

That was a two day session, and on Sunday on the way back I visited Randy Keeler and the other members of the War Resisters' Office in San Francisco. On this visit I showed Bert a copy of the draft of the letter we were working on, the Rand letter, as it stood there and also of the letter I had sent to Charles Bolte which had gone out on Rand letterhead and which I had shown to Harry Rowan. Rowan's attitude to the Bolte letter was that if Nixon's policy was as I described it, namely to get down to a certain number of troops, to stay there indefinitely with low casualties and reduced U.S. costs, and if the American public found that an acceptable strategy then what was wrong with it? To which I said we would still be bombing Vietnam, and that was not acceptable to me.

During this period I had been working with other people who had been in favor of extrication of a letter to go out from Rand. However, that's on a different tape and I won't repeat that all now, except to say that my first

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proposal had been that they should update their report of a year before on the subject of extrication. And they had pointed out that it would be impossible to get such a report cleared out of Rand, giving me a ---- example of how long it would take to get much more innocuous pieces cleared, various papers or research memoranda. It was their opinion that only a letter could get out, so we set out to research such a letter. I had come around to their earlier way of thinking on unilateral withdrawal.

Although it doesn't show, I know that September 30th was the day of the LA Times clipping about the story about the Green Beret charges, murder charges, the charges having been dropped by Nixon, which was the immediate catalyst for me to go to Tony Russo and ask him if he could find a xerox machine. He did that night for the next day, and we began working.

The letter, meanwhile, was to be shown to Harry Rowan the day we wanted to send it out, Monday October 6th, so I had less than a week to get ready. Since I expected that Harry would probably not allow the letter to go out, I decided I would have to resign from Rand on the grounds that if it were not possible to express one's view on such a matter it would be impossible for me to stay. That meant that I would have to be clearing out my safe in less than a week, so it was essential to work very fast at getting the material copied.

By the same token, it did not seem very essential to be extremely secretive outside of Rand in terms of what I was doing, since I expected the whole matter to be entirely open and public within days. And I was anxious that people close to me should have an understanding of why I had done what I had done. Therefore I wanted to demonstrate what I was doing and what my motives were before I was picked up, which might be within a week or two. None of this shows in the calendar, but it must have been Friday Oct. 3rd or

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Saturday, Oct. 4th when I had Robert help me do the xeroxing.

On Monday, October 6th we did show the letter to Harry, and to our surprise he okayed it.

On Tuesday, October 7th I had breakfast with Joe Kraft at 8:30; he happened to be in town. I told him about the letter. He had a later meeting with Harry and then saw me afterwards. The letter went out later that afternoon after much more discussion with Fred Ikle, who was furiously anxious that it not go out. We had had a meeting with Ikle on Monday the 6th as well.

The letter appeared in the New York Times on the 9th and we immediately got a lot of media attention. John Dotson of Newsweek, Paul Udell of KNX on Friday Oct. 10 when I was briefly on television, and Don Dunning of Time. The media people went through Rand; as a result, Rand did not allow any photographs taken, so we didn't get as much on us as they would liked to have put in. There was mention of it in Time and Newsweek, and I believe on Sunday 12th in the Washington Post the full letter came out.

That evening, the 12th, I saw ^{Narayan} Nuryon Desai at Pasadena at, a talk on Ghandian methods to which I took the children.

October 15th was the first big moratorium. I had been asked to attend several, to talk at several places, but I stayed aloof from it on the assumption that I would soon be testifying.

Meanwhile, the day after the letter appeared on Friday the 10th, I had been invited by Jim Rowenstein who worked for Senator Fulbright to appear at hearings on the Fulbright commission to testify on the withdrawal plan. They wanted just me, and Rand wanted my presence to be balanced by someone of a different opinion at Rand. So Chuck Cooper, also of the Economics Department, was invited in addition. But those hearings were postponed when the President announced he would be giving a speech on November 3.

I was invited to be on the program The Advocates on

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October 19th along with Chuck. Harry Rowan asked me urgently not to do that, since he wanted Rand to have as little publicity as possible. Rand was blowing up on him bureaucratically at this point. And I agreed, again on the assumption that the Fulbright committee was more important. I suggested that Joe ⁷Sasloff speak in my place, and I spent most of the day with Howard Miller, the advocate, getting him ready for his role. I watched the program that evening.

Going back a bit: I notice a notation on Friday, September 19th, Kimberley Rosenberg, and again Monday, September 22. These may have been my first dates with Kimberley. On the first we saw "Easy Rider," and I remember a number of things she said stiffened my resolution considerably, at least with the letter. Tony says that he remembers during that month raising questions with him about what I ought to do with the studies. I have no memory of having that thought in my mind until the 30th, when I decided to give them.

On Thursday, October 30th I saw Jess ^{Unruh} Onrauh and spent all morning discussing Vietnam with him. He was then considering running for Mayor, I guess. Victor ^{Palmieri} Palmery set up that meeting and was present during most of it.

On Sunday, Nov. 2, Pat arrived for a visit, and on the very afternoon that she arrived I got a call from Adam Wolinsky and then later from Sam Brown urging me to come immediately to Washington to help the Moratorium group, to make suggestions to Congressmen as to how they should answer the President's speech of November 3 on Vietnam policy. So again at my own expense I flew to Washington with Pat. We got there just in time to watch the speech at the Moratorium headquarters and to discuss it with Brown, whom I met for the first time.

We went to a conference of academics that was putting together a statement in answer to the speech to be given

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at a press conference the next day. The statement got very little coverage, however. The next day, among other things, I visited the conference of 10 liberal congressmen headed by Mikva. In Mikva's office I wrote out the document titled "Notes on the President's Speech of Nov. 3", which they proceeded to work into a resolution signed by 29 congressmen. It called for immediate withdrawal, using much of the language from the letter at Rand as well. My whole statement was put into the record by a couple of congressmen, Dick Lowenstein for one and a couple from California.

On Wednesday I saw representative ^{Ordin} Alton Reid at Congress, Senator Mondale at 3:30, Bill Miller (Senator Cooper's assistant) in the afternoon, and a number of others. I think I spent the evening of the 5th with Lowenstein. The 6th I saw Conboy of Goodell's office, Brian Conboy and Lowenstein. The 7th I saw Senator Goodell in the morning at 11:15. That may have been my first meeting with Goodell. I saw Harry Rowan in the afternoon. I had a date with ^{Phil Meyer} V. Gyllin, but I think I wasn't able to make that, in part because I knew Ward Just would be there.

On Monday I flew to Miami for a meeting of ORSA, Operations Research Society of America, where I was delivering a paper on Nov. 11 called "A Session in Analytical Methods ^{& Control} Control". During all of this time memos were being written at Rand denouncing all the people who had signed the Rand letter. It was quite a ^{cause célèbre} cozy lab, with one engineer trying to impeach Harry Rowan for allowing the letter to go out. He insisted on talking in front of the Rand trustees on this matter. My understanding at the time was that failing to convince the trustees that Harry should go, he himself resigned (though I'm not sure if he ever did resign).

November 20th I gave one of ^{Key Powder's} Key Powder's classes on Vietnam at UCLA at 7:30 and on the 24th gave a large talk at Rand to a seminar meeting on the limitation of systems analysis as it had not been used in Vietnam. Meanwhile, the

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proposed Senate hearings on the Goodell bill and others had been indefinitely postponed following the success of the President's speech of November 3rd. I saw ~~Y~~--- Dror on December 1st. At the time I was interested in his thoughts on what I should do in moving away from Rand. He made several suggestions, including going to Berkeley where ~~Will Dovsky~~ ^{Aaron Wildavsky} was building up a department. I saw ~~Will Dovsky~~ ^{Aaron Wildavsky} who was visiting Rand on that subject on December 2nd. I told him I had visited Berkeley for a seminar designed to look over people for the program on Public Administration on November 14th, and then Pat and I had participated in the Moratorium in San Francisco on the 15th. That evening we had visited the WRL people in San Francisco.

On December 12 I had what was to be my last meeting, or almost my last meeting, with Albert Wolstede^r, lunch with Albert~~a~~ and Roberta to discuss the circumstances of the Rand letter. Albert was quite unforgiving on the letter, although he had had very wrong ideas on just how it had come out. He had not realized, for example, that it had been cleared by Harry Rowan.

On the 27th I seem to have been in Cambridge. Note here that Van had been in Washington at the Shoreham on the 21st; I may have seen him there. Then on the 28th I saw Yarmolinsky, and Shelling and I had a talk in the afternoon. I saw ~~Y~~----- in the evening to discuss what I should do in the near future. It was clear at that time that I had no future in the Economics Department under Charlie Wolff. Relations were very strained there because of the Rand letter.

By December, 1969 it seemed clear that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was unlikely to use the Pentagon Papers material for hearings, at least until the spring and possibly not then. The public seemed solidly behind Nixon's strategy, or at least inclined to wait and see how it turned out. The sentiment, I suppose, was not to challenge him.

I was thinking at that point of leaving Rand shortly,

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having stayed on that long since the Rand letter only because I wanted the authority of association when I appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. But of course I was accused of exploiting Rand for precisely this reason by Charlie Wolff. But in fact I felt that the association was one that I had earned by 10 years of service of a sort that was precisely the kind that had given Rand its institutional prestige. Moreover, Harry Rowan had said flatly that he did not want me to resign just prior to testifying, since that would look as if Rand had fired me and he was still appearing to tread the thin line between appearing to censor ideas at Rand and trying to be too lenient on dissention. So I was beginning to think of other places I might go to explore contacts.

On December 5 ^{Halberstein} Dave Halverstein arrived and spent three days with me in Malibu interviewing me in great detail for purposes of his book. He wanted my interview to be the first one he conducted, so I would ^{suggest} ask him questions he ^{sk} would ask and give him a general framework. He had offered at this time to let me see the results of his other interviews, though this was something he never in fact did. He had also promised to send me a transcript of the interview with me, but in fact it took him well over 6 months or a year to do so. However, recently he told me that he found very little to learn from the Pentagon Papers in terms of general concepts precisely because the interview with me had provided him with so much of the available insight from those studies. That took from December 5th to the 7th.

The 27th in the East I had a long talk with Shelling about prospects for employment and the next day talked with Yarmolinsky in Cambridge. I had also talked with Marty Shubick during this period. Yarmolinsky decided me to change course considerably by asking probing questions, professional career guidance being Yarmolinsky's speciality. I concluded at that point that I would stay at Rand at

least through July and perhaps much longer, finish the book on Vietnam on the relatively non-controversial subjects of pacification and learning and politics in Vietnam without getting into the area of U.S. decision making processes at all. That would probably be a book I could get cleared out of Rand and could be finished by June.

I decided I might well stay on even longer and work on a book on crises which probably in general terms could be cleared out of Rand, and perhaps even further to finish up my Ph.D. thesis on subject ^{ive} probability, which would of course provide no clearance problems. The latter could take me through to December or through to the following June.

So I was resigned to stay at Rand and stay off the Vietnam study project for perhaps a year and a half in the expectation that there was little prospect for very effective dissent during that period, since Nixon would be reducing force levels slowly and the North Vietnamese would be inclined to let him do so without disturbing his schedule. So the next year and a half would be fairly quiet, and the public would not respond to too much criticism of the policy. Although Halperin had told me in September that escalation was in fact part of the policy, I found that hard to believe. To me the major ills of the policy at that time were that it did envision years more combat activity and in particular bombing in Indochina with heavy casualties on both sides, and particularly for the Vietnamese even without escalation. And there always was a risk of escalation, though I saw that as pressure coming from the North.

On January 1st I saw David McEkron ^{ackron} of the Council of Foreign Relations to discuss his interest in my coming for the Council as a Council Fellow for a year or more to write a book for them. That seemed the most likely possibility if I wanted to leave Rand, but it didn't appear to me that there was any advantage in my doing that at the Council rather than at Rand. So at that stage I was lying low on the subject

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of Vietnam policy, and was not pressing the subject of the Pentagon Papers anymore immediately. This also reflected the feeling that the Pentagon Papers no longer seemed like the vehicle of resistance to Nixon's policy. Since Nixon's policy was perceived as a new departure from the Johnson-Kennedy policy that had preceded it, and thus Fulbright's reservation, which he had had from the start (namely that this would be seen simply as history) would be very likely the effect if the Pentagon Papers were revealed after November 3.

Prior to that I thought they were particularly relevant since they would make it easier for Nixon to renounce the policy that was shown so consistently through the earlier administrations, but now it would be too easy for him to say, "Well, that was Johnson's policy and I've changed that," and thus brush it off. It wasn't until the 2nd invasion later after that, the Laos invasion in the spring of 1971, that it seemed that this response by Nixon had been sufficiently undermined. So that once again the Pentagon Papers seemed relevant to current policy.

All in all, December was quite a down month for me with the political triumph of Nixon's approach. His policy was exactly what I had started out to deflect and modify but still one which was proving to be politically stable. The risks that I had taken to give the Pentagon Papers to the Senate seemed to be having no consequences in the short run and I looked forward to the kind of writing I was going to be doing in the spring without much enthusiasm, since I would not be able to deal with the more interesting decision making aspects. My staying at Rand at this point was done in good faith in a sense since I did not have any new crisis in mind that I would be causing for Rand employees and the institution.

I went the first week in January to go skiing in Aspen with Patricia and John Sach. I have a few notations

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for January.

February 4. Dick Moose of the Senate Foreign Relations staff arrived, having asked to get some briefings at Rand and to talk to people there on his way over to Laos and Vietnam, his first trip for the Committee. He had asked only to speak to me and to Dick Moorsteen, but I suggested he talk to some others and routinely put the word out at Rand that he was coming and anyone who wanted to speak to him should make appointments through me. This ended up causing an enormous flurry of bureaucratic panic at Rand at the thought of someone outside of the executive branch coming in, especially one from the camp of the enemy, Fulbright's committee.

Negotiation was carried on with ARPA and ISA and guidelines were set down as to who should talk to him and what should be discussed. There were directives on memos to be written on the basis of the conversations after each one. I was specifically asked not to bring him into contact with Conrad Kellen, for one. I would have been on that list except I was the person making the contacts. This flurry made a particularly bad impression on Patricia I remember. She felt that there was something wrong with my staying with an organization where I had to worry at such length or be involved with such concern over whether a representative of a congressman could speak to this person or that. As it worked out, Moose did run into Kellen and did have a talk with him, and this did run into some criticism of my monitoring of his visit.

Randy Keeler's trial was on the 9th and 10th of February in Wyoming, at the end of which he was found guilty of non-cooperation with the draft and sentenced to two years in prison. His wife, Jane Shulman, spent a night with me on the way to California, having left Randy off at the prison (Safford Prison in Arizona). Meanwhile I was getting word that Tran Nguc Chau was being pursued and

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going to trial in Vietnam, allegedly because of seeing his brother, though actually because he'd criticized the corrupt dealing of Theiu's bagmen in the legislative assembly and also had been calling for negotiations.

Van arrived on February 11th from Vietnam and I spoke with him by phone. I got quite a bit of information on the situation with Chau and arranged to see Van later during his trip.

On the 11th I guess I left for New York for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Relations of Jim Thompson's study on the 12th which dealt with S.E. Asia. Then on Friday the 13th there was a meeting of SEDAG, South East Asia Development Advisory Group which was attended by Ambassador Sullivan, formerly Ambassador of Laos and now the Deputy Assistant Secretary in charge of Vietnam in the State Department. I talked to a number of people who were present at this meeting, all of whom knew Chau and encouraged them to speak up to Sullivan about Chau's treatment at this trial.

This proved very effective. To Sullivan's amazement nearly every person around the room took him on on the subject with the exception of Ithiel Pool, who had previously tried to hire Chau for MIT but did not indicate in the conversation that he knew him. But Allen Goodman, Sam Popkin, John Donnell, Joe Sasloff and in particular Milton Sachs in addition to myself all took on Sullivan very harshly for the implication's of Theiu's treatment of the Buddhists and of Chau in particular.

Van told me that when he went back to Washington he saw him that afternoon and spoke with amazement at how upset American consultants were over the Chau situation, about which he knew very little at that point. That seemed promising. That was my main reason for attending this SEADAG meeting. It was the first time I had ever been invited, since SEADAG did research but also consulting for AID and got AID money for its research. Traditionally

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the chairman of the subcommittee on Vietnam was a hawk, Sam Huntington or Itiel Pool. But on this occasion it was Joe Sasloff, formerly of Rand, who had done the first work on the motivation and moral study on interrogation of Viet Cong prisoners for Rand. When Joe had briefed boss John McNaughton on that study in December of 1964, McNaughton's reaction at the end of the discussion was "If what you say is true, we are fighting on the wrong side." And I had acknowledged to Joe in subsequent years that he had been right and I had been wrong during that period.

In any case, he had invited me to attend this meeting and I had gone mainly for the purpose of discussing Chau. So I was well satisfied with that. The dates are a little confused but could be checked. Apparently on the 20th and 21st of February I was in Washington for a Congressional Inquiry on War Crimes in Vietnam, the transcript of which came out in a book, War Crimes in the American Conscience, published by Holt Rinehart, with a number of comments by me. During that period I saw Van several times and at that moment Van was testifying to the Foreign Relations Committee, partly on pacification but in particular on Chau, since I had gotten Fulbright through Moose to make a statement about Chau publicly, and to hold private discussion with Dick Helms and with State on the subject. Van was called to testify in secret. He had given so much information privately to Moose and to me and was in fact leaking a good deal to various journals; yet he was relatively circumspect in what he said in open committees, since he had Ambassador Colby at his side and he expressed some criticisms of Chau as well as confidence in him. This led some people to think that he had abandoned Chau, although from Van's point of view he had done the effective work privately. This included some long sessions with Charles Cook and at State, working for Richardson, and raising the subject with Kissinger in

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the White House.

I may have seen Van in Denver on the 22nd on the way home, or I might have gone back to Denver with Van and stayed a day there with him. The diary is somewhat inconclusive. He had not had the session with Cook then; Cook was in Vietnam. Cook arrived Thursday, March 5 from Vietnam, and I spent the evening with him coming down quite heavily on Chau's situation. He had raised it himself at the Embassy and had gotten enough information from the chief of the CIA mission there to make it clear that false ----- were being raised about Chau and that in fact the mission did not know very much about Chau at that time.

I mentioned that sometime earlier before the Congressional inquiry in Washington, I had gotten a call from Dick Moose to alert me that he had talked to Chau himself in Saigon and had then heard the Ambassador say in his presence and to Senator Dong Von Sung that he had incontrovertible proof that Chau was a communist. When he confronted the station chief with this statement the station chief was very surprised and said he had no such evidence, that he could not understand the Ambassador saying this.

In retrospect it was that statement that was the green light for Thieu to begin his moves against Chau, which he began to do. That had taken place in December, and I'd been in touch with Moose since then on the subject. After hearing Cook, who spoke at Rand on Friday, March 6th when he left, I began to work harder on the subject of organizing sentiment in support of Chau and arranged with the New York Times a deadline to do a piece on Chau for the Magazine section. We arranged the deadline of March 22nd on Tuesday, March 10th. On the 10th I flew to Pittsburgh, where I gave a talk sponsored by Lynn Topick and Thomas Kerr to the Carnegie School of Business. I discussed the Chau case as symptomatic of other problems in Vietnam. I flew on to Washington to

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see a number of newspaper men. I had by this time given several telephone interviews on Chau's case which had been quoted. I was back of most of the publicity there was appearing about Chau although some dispatches were coming from Saigon as well, mainly through the auspices of Van.

In Washington on the 12th I saw a number of newspaper men. But on the 11th I went over to State to see Charlie Cook and to my surprise he urged me to read the entire file of cables on Van. However, it was clear he wanted my advice on what to do. It was also clear that he was engaged himself in leaking to the press, and more openly than I had ever seen this done. In front of me he talked to a couple of newspaper men, one of them Joe Kraft, who had written already with Charles as the source a good column on Chau. I asked him if I could take notes and he said fine, so I sat there in his office with a number of people trooping in and out in the course of it copying down most of the relevant cables dealing with Chau.

It was a horrifying session, because I had not read cables for some time, current cables. I somehow had the feeling that I had gotten away from it and I was newly sensitized to the crassness and inhumanity and ignorance that exuded from these cables. It was quite a depressing session reading them inasmuch as the human whose life was being dealt with so coldly and ~~who also~~ was a close friend of mine. In the ensuing days several newsmen called me about Chau, having been referred to me by Cook. I took these notes back to write some thoughts based on them and the first thing I did on getting back to Rand was to write two long memos based on the cables, the patterns they revealed. I did this for Cook's benefit, thinking he would give them to Richardson, which he did in the end. Vu Van Thai may have been around Rand on the 15th when I got back.

On the 16th my deadline was extended to the 29th of March for the New York Times article. On the 18th of

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March I have a notation there was a ^{Johnson} Council group meeting at the Council for Foreign Relations in New York, which I may or may not have attended, I'm not sure. I did discuss the Chau material with Harry Rowan and proposed to show him the papers I have written, but I remarked before I did so that Cook seemed to be involved in a leaking operation and that he might not want to know anything about it. At which point he hastily said, yes, that would be better. Chen

On the 24th of March I gave a talk that I had been urged to give by Pierre Uliassi of Intelligence and Research in the State Department. The subject was called "Lying in State" and he had collected quite a roomful of people who wanted to hear me discuss this. It seems that I had gotten a call from Uliassi right after the Rand letter had appeared. He had said that he wanted to congratulate me, ~~that~~ ^{that} I had never heard of him before. He said "I admire you and I feel guilty." I asked him why he felt guilty, and he said "Because I feel the same way you do about the war and I have done nothing and I'm not going to do anything." After a pause, he said, "Wait a minute, that's not true, I will do something." He said that he was in charge of a program of seminars in the State Department and thereby asked me to join them to give a seminar. It was not until this month that I was finally able to do it. Correction: I had given the seminar entitled "Lying in State" I believe during the fall of '69 and there had been so much discussion of it afterwards that he urged me to come and essentially give the same seminar again to another group of people who had berated him for not informing them. So it was on this occasion that I gave the second session, which dealt with the effects of secrecy upon the information flow up to the President. Chen

One of the themes was that when the President himself desired to deceive the American people, the effect of this was to pollute the information that he himself received by internal channels, since there was a strong premium on

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information that would support the public position and create reluctance to pass on information that might leak and appear to be in opposition to his public statements. There were a number of other propositions that came from this, some of which were quoted by Tony Lake when he wrote an article for Foreign Policy on the subject of lying in the State Department. In fact, he wrote a variation on the same pun for a title. I think he called it "Lying Around Washington."

In the evening of March 24th, there was a meeting, the first I believe, of Les Gelb's study group on Vietnam. The work he was doing^{was} allegedly from unclassified sources, obviously drawing heavily on the Pentagon Papers at the Brookings Institute. To preserve its tax exempt status, Brookings had to undertake to do no classified research, no Government sources. So Gelb had to go through elaborate procedures of finding unclassified sources for propositions he had really arrived at through a study of the classified documents.

Among the people at the first session were Chip ^{Bollen} Bolan and Henry Owens, now Gelb's boss and formerly chairman of the Policy Planning Committee in the State Department. Also Milton Sachs, Stan Hoffman, Dick Moorsteen and a number of other luminaries on Vietnam, but on policy. I think the head of this study group was William Langer, the dean of diplomatic historians; and a question had been raised about allowing me in the group since by this time, of course, I was really a well known critic of the war. But Gelb had insisted that it was essential to have someone in the group who actually knew the subject of Vietnam decision making.

Halperin was also in the group, so it had the three people by that time who had read the Pentagon Papers. Incidentally, after the Pentagon Papers had come out, Gelb informed me that it was the desire of Henry Owen and ----- Gordon, head of Brookings, that I resign from the group and

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that if I did not they might have to fire me. I thought that over for a while and then told them that I did not propose to resign from the group. It ^{has} had not held a meeting since that time.

Although it does not show up here, I can check it from the dates of newspaper stories: it must have been on this same visit to Washington around the 25th of March that I saw more cables at Charlie Cook's office. I showed him my two memoirs, which he did proceed to show to Richardson, and at some point gave material from the cables to Flora Lewis. I told Charlie that I had done so and he said that was okay. I had asked him before I did so if it was okay to quote directly from the cables, and he said yes, that was all right. I specifically asked him in case the cables were directly linked to him, and he said he did not believe there was any problem. At one point I asked him if Richardson knew all that he was doing and he said Richardson knew in the general way, though not all the details, and did approve. I had told him that my commitment to Chau was such that I was prepared to take the rap if these leaks came to worst, though it was my assumption that some investigation might be necessary.

During this period I was taking vacation from Rand to work on the article on Chau which Harry and Jim Digby had told me could go out without clearance. I won't repeat the story of leaving Rand, except for crucial dates. The latest deadline on the Chau piece had come to be April 12, I believe, and was to appear the following week.

On April 7th several things came together. Either that day or a day earlier I was told by Charlie Cook (which I had discussed with him earlier) of the Chau leaks, things had proceeded to a point where they were likely to call Harry Rowan. I would assume that this would have been embarrassing to Harry, though not necessarily. At the same time I learned from Carol that the FBI had visited her six weeks

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earlier, as she put it, asking her to talk about top secret documents that her husband had copied. She had refused at the time, had seen her lawyer and he had refused, but they went back to the lawyer urging that he see them and the lawyer, Mr. Stone, had finally said I should be informed so that he could confer with my lawyer. I did call Bob Herstein the next day, and he got in touch with Stone and concluded that they should not say anything to the FBI. Stone concluded this after talking to Herstein on the grounds that she didn't want to discuss her former husband with them. This was on April 8.

That same day Arnold Horlich of Social Science, one of my fellow co-signers on the Rand letter, came in with the information that a member of the Physics Department had come to him to tell him that the physics division was planning a coup: essentially, they were in secret negotiations with John Foster of the DOD to arrange their own contract, after which they planned to split off from Rand as a department. They had managed to keep excellent secrecy on this, even though there were several members who had misgivings about it.

I told Harry about it, I believe the evening of April 8, and gave him a great many suggestions as to what might be done, slipping into my crisis manager mold which had earned me such high salaries and positions in the past. Harry did go into action on the suggestions, calling Foster on the phone and ending up going to Washington himself, thus preempting a meeting between Foster and the head of the physics division who was to make the final arrangements for the split.

The upshot of that was that the physics division decided to stay at Rand, at least temporarily. Recently they did end up by splitting off, I'd say about a year later.

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It made it clear that if I were to go ahead with the Chau article at that point without clearing it that that would call great criticism down on Harry and would seem to confirm the precise charges made by the physics rebels, which included the charges that he had not been sufficiently firm on the Rand letter, he was lax in disciplining his staff and not sufficiently concerned about his relations with the Defense Department. So for his benefit I had to cancel the article and I told him that and he was quite relieved to hear it.

However, the same day I was in quite a passionate mood of frustration at feeling that I could not write openly about a case like Chau's or help my friend from Rand. At the same time it was clear to me that I had to separate myself from Rand before the FBI came down on me, which might be any moment, so as to make it as easy on Rand as possible. Inevitably the situation would be embarrassing for Rand, but at least it would be better if I were no longer in the building. So I called Thursday after calling the New York Times to tell them I had to cancel the article. I called Everett Hagen at MIT who had called me a month or two earlier with an offer to work for a year at MIT. I asked him if the offer was still open, and whether I would be able to write anything I wanted.

He assured me that no one would even look at what I wrote before I published it. They offered me the same salary as Bill Bundy, which was the highest salary they could give, and I accepted on Friday April 10th and arranged to go to MIT the next Friday or Saturday to sign the papers. While I was in Cambridge to do that, I believe Monday 13th... I signed into MIT on the 13th, 14th or possibly the 15th. It doesn't show in my notes but my leave at Rand came on the 15th. One other consideration was that I had been asked to speak before the Fulbright Committee on May 13th and Charlie Wolff was in particular anxious to have me away from Rand as long as possible before that. So he asked

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that it became effective immediately on April 15th, I think that was the day I spoke to him, rather than stay on until the end of the month. I did stay on as a consultant to Rand at that point.

In this period I transferred some papers to Cambridge and sent a very large batch of them, essentially all that had not been sent to the Foreign Relations Committee, having copied a good deal more in the spring than I had previously done. On April 24th I had my second meeting with SEADAG, now in the status of a Rand consultant and on half time with MIT, although I was still residing at Malibu. Tony Russo accompanied me, having been invited by Joe Zassloff against my own wishes, since Tony had for some time been increasingly erratic. He suffered something like a breakdown early on in the year.

On the second day of the SEADAG meeting I raised the question as to where their financing came from and what their relation to the Government was. The question was as if it had come from the CIA. They denied this, but without all the assurance one might have wished. But on the issue of Government financing they made it clear that SEADAG people were expected to consult with the Government helping to implement their policies. Not only that, but some of the motives for leaving Rand were incompatible with my maintaining that relationship with AID for I quit SEADAG as well. That episode is described somewhat in the Studs Terkel interview in this issue of Harpers.

The last part of April I was working to have a particular paper done for publication by Rand as an RN and this was to be done by June 1st. It was to be called "Revolutionary Jude". I was also beginning to work on my Fulbright testimony.

On May 4 I was called by Howard Miller on the Advocates to help him as a consultant in lining up speakers and arranging questions for a special program to be done the

Dan Ellsberg Tapes Chronology relating to alleged conspiracy following Sunday on the subject of the Cambodian invasion. This was arranged on short notice. On May 5 I flew to Washington with Miller.

On May 6 we saw Clifford. I had earlier had a long session with Clifford toward the end of the year because he had been given my name as someone who ought to work with him on drafting an article for him in Life on Vietnam policy. This was a follow up of his article in the summer of 1969 calling for on the surface a Vietnamization program and a quick reduction. He wanted to go beyond that now and I discussed policy with him. I had a long session with him on that occasion and later a long telephone conversation. He had asked me to come and work for him for 4 or 5 weeks on the subject, but since I was committed at that point to getting a book out by June Harry had vetoed my doing that. Harry also thought it was incompatible with my being at Rand, even if I took leave to do that. It was clear at that time that it would not have been incompatible for me to do that for an executive branch official, of course, but for someone critical of our policy and working on the outside it would have been, even though he was a former Secretary of Defense.

On this occasion Clifford did not want to criticize the President's position in Cambodia and was remarkably evasive, spending a good deal of time in fact talking about Sesame Street, praising it, apparently on the belief that Miller was a television executive, which he wasn't. It was very difficult to get him on the subject of Cambodia; he made it clear that he did not want to make a public statement at that time.

The same turned out to be true of nearly every other person we approached, including Shoup and Ridgeway. Ridgeway claimed that he did not agree that this did seem to be a very bad operation. He did not want to jeopardize his access to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by making a public statement unless it seemed that he had all the facts at his disposal. He admitted that his JCS access did not give him all the facts,

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since he had been talking to Westmoreland on the very day the invasion started and Westmoreland had not given him a clue. Neither were Hillsman or various other people that we approached.

On Saturday Miller said that he had decided that I should be the one to be on the program, along with Senator Goodell. Meanwhile, I was due to give my first public teachin against the war in St. Louis at Washington University. I flew to that on Friday, May 8 and gave a talk there on Friday evening along with Senator Mathias. Mathias and I flew back to Washington on Saturday, May 9th and had a very friendly talk on the plane. The town was besieged at that point, having been invaded by a couple of hundred thousand students. By that night there was a great deal of teargassing. I can't remember whether it was that night or the next day that there was a lot of teargas in the vicinity of the White House. Pat and I walked through.

It was perhaps that weekend that the students missed the best chance of getting decisive congressional action by shutting the town down, since they had enough students there who were disposed to nonviolent action, but for some reason the New Mobe marshals urged them not to undertake civil disobedience. So the day was essentially wasted by a rally, and Congress instead turned its attention to the Church-Cooper bill, using up its energy on that more or less useless operation rather than focusing on the war as a whole.

I did appear on Sunday night on the Advocates, my first public appearance on television as a critic of the war except for some interviews about Chau and the Rand letter. On the other side were Ambassador Sullivan and Senator Dole, who made the memorable comment that the life of one American soldier was more important than any imaginary line, to which Miller commented, "The imaginary line of which you are speaking, Senator, is an international boundary." And Dole shrugged that off with "I don't care what you call it,

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it is an imaginary line."

The next day on that visit I saw Dick Barnett of the Institute of Policy Studies, and apparently Ralph Stevens in the evening - that may have been my first visit with Ralph Stevens. I saw Jonathan More who was now over at State and was working for Richardson, and actually had Laos under his purview. He was the Assistant Deputy of the Secretary of Defense, parallel to Sullivan. More was extremely nervous about seeing me in State, though willing to do it. He explained he was against the Cambodian invasion but had decided to stay on in State, and having made that decision would have to be circumspect. He asked me not to let it be known generally that he had seen me. The upshot of this was that Richardson was more or less fired from the State Department and moved over to HEW, where both Cook and More followed him. So essentially all the doves were plucked out of state. The next morning, May 13, I gave my testimony to Fulbright, having written a statement to be reproduced and handed out the night before.

I saw Stevens and Raskin in the afternoon of the 13th, the day I testified with Schoenberg. Chuck Cooper also testified briefly from Rand to counterbalance my testimony, although I was no longer at Rand and it was no longer really necessary. He was dealt with rather summarily. Cooper's loyalty was later rewarded by making him Economic Councillor in Saigon where I believe he still is.

On the 14th I returned and met with a class at UCLA where I gave a couple of hour lectures to a class of 1000 that had been convened hastily in connection with the Cambodian invasion. I gave two lectures, one at 8 and one at 11 the next morning as preparation for students going out into the community to survey attitudes about the invasions. Thus my first week away from Rand I had managed to get a good deal of exposure at the Fulbright Committee, television, and two universities.

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On June 9 I went out with some members of this class from UCLA to do their house-to-house survey with them in Orange County. Though most of June I worked to finish the piece "Revolutionary Judo", which I did finish, staying up all night the night of June 29th, finishing up my obligations with Rand and signing out simultaneously. I did not sign out until I left the area, although I went in very little from that time on. Instead I spent my time at home working on a paper which became "Escalating in a Quagmire". I did go in a few times and did a little more copying in the course of the summer. By this time we concluded we were not about to hear from the FBI.

Meanwhile I had gotten in touch with Al Appleby of BEM for the first time, I believe on June 24th, for lunch and he became interested in sponsoring me to talk to other businessmen, setting up various things for me. One of these was a visit to Sam Stewart, a Vice President of the Bank of America in San Francisco to whom I had talked on July 7, and also saw the editorial board of the San Francisco Chronicle. Stewart was interested in getting an impression of me to see if I should speak to the Board of the Bank of America, but nothing came of that.

In the evening I spoke to a BEM meeting at the house of Jack Nidell on the war. July 12 I gave a talk to a USC student seminar. It's not obvious from my dates here, I had been to a conference at Columbia sponsored by the legal action fund on war crimes with my contact being Tom Engel at Columbia. I had been invited by Telford Taylor, who was chairing the subcommittee on war crimes, and I had given a long talk which I think I've described elsewhere. I offered myself as a defendant, among other things, in a possible war crimes trial if that would be helpful in getting such trials heard.

July 14 I gave a long interview to a BEM representative

that was broadcast on KRHM in L.A. on two successive nights.

July 20th there was a conference at Rand, from the 20th until the 27th, on Bureaucracy and Policy, which had been set up by Mort Halperin and Les Gelb. It included Ernie May, Dick Neustadt, Warner Shilling, Steinbrunner of Harvard, and Dick Omen, along with Dick Holbrook, Dick Moorsteen and several others from Rand. I was the key person at this conference, and as a matter of fact one of my main reasons for wanting to postpone our wedding and stay at Rand for the summer was to attend this conference in which I was very interested.

All the people attending had clearances and were given access among other things to Neustadt's Skybolt study, which it turned out he had passed out to some of his seminars at Harvard, an unmarked version that is an unclassified copy. Also a number of copies of the Pentagon Papers were made available to this group for all of them to read. That general conference probably deserves more attention.

July 28th I saw Louie Lundborg, Chairman of the Board of the Bank of America, who had been induced by Appleby to testify against the war at the Fulbright hearings in May. I had a very friendly session with him. The next day, July 29th, Appleby had scheduled a very large lunch for newsmen at which I described where I thought Nixon's policy was going and the dangers that it held, which I said included possible efforts at censorship. That drew a very strong response from some of the people there who said I had lost credibility and lost my audience by such an extreme suggestion. That

offering myself as a defendant among other things in a possible war crimes trial if that would be helpful in getting such trials heard. July 14 I gave a long interview to a BEM representative that was broadcast on KRHM in L.A. on two successive nights. July 20 a conference at Rand between the 20 and 27 on Bureaucracy and Policy which had been set up by Mort Halperin and Les Gelb. and included Ernie May, Dick Neusdadt, Warner Shilling, Steinbrunner, of Harvard and Dick Omen. along with Dick Holbrook, Dick Morestein. several others from Rand. I was the key person at this conference and as a matter of fact one of my main reasons for wanting to postpone our wedding for one thing and stay at Rand for the summer was to attend this conference in which I was very interested. All the people attending had clearances and were given access among other things to Neustadts Skybolt study which it turned out he had passed out to some of his senior to some of his seminars at Harvard in an unmarked version that is an unclassified copy, and also a number of copies of the Pentagon papers were made available to this group to all of them to read. That general conference probably deserves more attention. July 28 I saw Louie Lundborg Chairman of the Board of Bank of America who had been induced by Appleby to testify against the war at the Fulbright hearings in May. Had a very friendly session with him. the next day July 29 Appleby had scheduled a very large lunch for newsmen at which I described where I thought Nixon's policy was going. and the dangers that it held. which I said included possible efforts at censorship. That drew a very strong response from some of the people there who said I had lost credibility and lost my audience by such an extreme suggestion. That came in particular from the editor of the Santa Monica paper called Encounter. or Outlook. The man interviewing me on that occasion was Clive Hoffman. Meanwhile my wedding was approaching. Having first proposed in the fall of 1969 gone through a period when Patricia was uncertain about her relations with someone else and then about the prospects of my

being arrested at any moment but when that died down in May and June we put the date for August 8 . I flew to New York about August 3. August 4 was scheduled for a set of meetings sponsored by Henry Niles the chairman head of BEM who was accompanied by Vinny McGree the executive director of BEM . We had lunch at the downtown association 60 Pine Street with a so called lawyers committee which included Hubbard, Plimpton, a number of lawyers from Wall Street brokerage and law firms to discuss the war and what I thought Nixon's policy was. At 2.30 Niles took me to see Sander Van Oker . I have a note here of A H Raskin of the Times but I don't remember whether we did eventually see him.

Van Oker we did have a talk in which he said to me that he did feel desperate about the war and was prepared to anything to stop it. I described Tony Lake to him in the hopes that Tony could be induced to appear on television and tell the world what Kissinger's and Nixon's policy was but I couldn't guarantee to deliver Lake though he seemed very interested. I described the McNamara study to him without telling him that I had it and asked him what he would do if he had it. He said he would give a talk with the study simply piled 6 feet high next to him. as he spoke on 60 minutes television. and I said if it were live how would he keep the FBI from breaking down the door before he were finished. but he said he was very interested if there was such a chance of getting such material . August 5 Stavens met us at the city hall where we were getting our wedding licence. He came back to start looking through the material which he did all through the 6th and 7th. On the 8th having confirmed with Herstein who had advised me not to let the material out of my hands but at my discretion to allow Stavens to see it and take notes . Stavens had convinced me that as a practical matter he had to have the material. to take extensive notes from and he did take it. I let him have it, not all it, with the proviso that he should not xerox any of it but only type some of it. This was when I was under the impression that a typed copy might be less incriminating than a full xerox copy. He was also to delete

any markings or date time groups from the cables.

That was either the morning of the 8th or the afternoon of the 7th. We were almost late to the wedding while on a long conversation with Janaki while she gave us the names of her friends in Cambridge. She was in the process of adopting a baby Guatama ~~whxxx~~ which she took with her to Tanzania where she went shortly thereafter. On the 8th I got married and lost my wallet that evening in the helicopter terminal in New York thus losing all sense of identity as Daniel Ellsberg shortly. Thus Pat has to use her own credit cards for the honeymoon which were in the name of Marx and incidentally losing my identity cards for Washington including the Pentagon, the State department and expired cards for CIA. We then went off on a honeymoon to Hawaii which was cut short after two weeks on the belief that I was to see Henry Kissinger. This being the suggestion of Lloyd Shearer who arranged it before we left. However Kissinger was not able to make the appointment and I spent the time writing my paper escalating in a quagmire which I wrote in one week after having lost my entire briefcase filled with notes at the airport on our return from the honeymoon. It got picked up so adroitly at that point that I suspected the FBI was following me at that point. The 28th a friend of Chaus called Duong Von Ba arrived in town and through Shearer we arranged for him to go out to San Clemente and talk to Kissinger although in the end I'm not sure he did see Kissinger. He did see General Hague and held a brief press conference. The idea was to get him into see the President for at least Kissinger. I did not accompany him since at that time I was scheduled to see Kissinger myself. the next week and I didn't want to interfere with that.

The 31st seems to have been spent calling Kissinger and Daley but appointments kept being broken. We did go out apparently Sept. 1st but I ended up having lunch with Winston Lord and General Hague having been asked out of the session with Kissinger who spent it with Shearer entirely. But Kissinger did urge me to get in touch with him some days later when he would be back in San Clemente. Meanwhile Ralph Saavens

and Mark Raskin turned up in Malibu for a brief visit with the astounding news that I was not longer represented by Council. It seems that That they gone to their own lawyer Mitchell Regovin and it turned out that Bob Herstein was representing me in connectin with the same papers about which they were inquiring. The firm went into a panic at the thought of being in a conspiracy with two parties in this operation and apparently one partner actually proposed that they call the FBI and inform them of what was afoot. In the end they concluded they would not represent eithe of us so I was left entirely without representation. Herstein's explanation for not having told me was that he had expected to see me shortly . Meanwhile he said he would try to find someone to represent me . He delayed on this very long and fainll came up of Vorensberff of the Law School but meanwhile I had already seen Boudin one time. On 10th I saw Kissinger alone for about half an hour at 11.30. at which I discussed with him the necessity for his working on the Pentagon Papers to draw lessons from them. I believe I have described this elsewhere. He was very anxious that I should come to see him for a longer sessinon to discuss options the following week but that would have left Patricia alone to do all the moving so I declined that and said I would call him when I got to Cambridge. On Saturday Sept. 12 I delivered by paper escalatin g in a quagmire which a year later was awarded the American Political Science award for the best paper presented at the conference . It did draw entirely upon the Pentagon papers and actually quoted them in a couple of parts for which I was reproved by Gelb and Halperin . Halperin made no comment on basing the argument as a whole on the PP's felt I should remove the direct quotes by McNamara. which had not come out elsewhere, from the paper in its final form. He didn't feell it urgen to pull back any of the copies that had been sent out . The following week I moved to MIT Sept. 14 . I did call Kissinger several times in the week of Spt. 21st. and appointments were made for me to see him but on two occasions were broken. at the very last moment because

he was involved in something . I'm not sure just what it was. In the end I had misgivings about calling him at all I felt I was just being used to establish how liberal he was toward listening to dissenting voices. So in the end I stopped calling him. 24th September I was in Washington for a conference at the Institute of Policy Studies called by Ravanall in which I gave the short version of the Escalating in a Quagmire. Friday night there was a party given for me at Mort Halperins at which I met Tony Lake for the first time and at which Stavens made it clear when asked to return the Pentagon papers he said that would be impossible. I thought that meant over the weekend but that meant he intended to ~~go~~ do more work on them or to take more notes . This exchange took place in front of Herstein and made it clear that I could not rely on the Institute for the control of the copies or for even being sure of ever getting the copies back. That was Wpte. 25th or Sat. 26th . Oct. 4 Van was in Washington the next week or so but its not clear from this when or if I saw him during that peirod . I'm sure I did see him on Oct 15th. in N.Y. when he had a few hours stopover at the apartment and we had a discussion then. Oct. 24th I saw Mort Halperin in Camrbridge . Oct 27th I gave a talk to John Henry's seminar for the Kennedy Institute of Policits. This was a series of seminars Henry was having preparatory to having his thesis and book to be on decision making in 1968. This was also addressed by Bill Bundy, Neustadt , Halperin and othersand Schiller. Allbeing quite illuminating background on the decision making. The 4th I gave a seminar at MIT on the subject of war crimes. It was attended by Bill Kauffman among others. Nov. 13 and 14 I saw Anthony Austin of the N.Y. Times for extended interviews in preparation for his book on the Tonkin Gulf incidents . He did several interviews which did go beyond the PP's and solved some of the mysteries

about the Tonkin Gulf that were not solved in the Pentagon Papers..He was also shown the relevant parts of the PP's by a source that he had thought was independent of me. that turned out to be Carl Marsey of the Senate Foreign Relations committee of course was shown in the documents that I had given the Fulbright Committee. Nov. 17 I gave the paper to the council of foreign relations study group under Robert Osgood and Robert Pierre.on the subject of the uses of Military Power in a new context. This was the paper which was later subpoenaed by the FBI.

Sturday Nov. 21st Patricia and I attended the Yale game at Harvard. Just after the game we saw spray painted on a building a sign saying Hanoi bombed . I think it said Murderer's Hanoi bombed. We went to the crismon to find out what was happening and the news had come over the AP. An allegation by Hanoi that ~~xxx~~ the outskirts of Hanoi had been rocketed and bombed.and a denial by the defense department that suppressive force had taken place much further south. That there had been no expenditure of ammunition in the vicinity of Hanoi at all. However if the reports from Hanoi were to be believed there was heavy bombing going on. Of course it turned out that Hanoi was correct and that the denials by Laid in person and spokesmen in backgrounders had been lies. We were scheduld that night to have dinner in Newport but instead I ended up on the phone calling all over the east coast trying to organize some sort of reaction to this bombing isasmuch as it seemed the kind of demonstration that might be last phase before mjaor full scale bombing of vietnam and even the invasion of North Vietnam. I didn't expect this to take place immediately or even soon but it did seem that if this particular demonstration went by without much reaction from the antiwar movement or from the public then Nixon himself would take this as an indication that he had little to fear of domestic reaction and had a free hand in any further escalation. Earlier at a teachin at B.U. In the fall I made the comment

that the best thing that we could hope for was that the next escalation would be only the invasion of Laos and not the invasion of N. Vietnam. so that possibly a public reaction could be mounted ^{that would deter} ~~xxxxxx~~ Nixon from full scale escalation of N. Vietnam. AT this point I saw the next steps whether they wre the invasion of Laos or steps of crime against N. Vietnam as coming sooner than we expected and possibly very soon. so it seemed to me extremely urgent that as strong a protest be mounted as possible. However on a Saturday night trying to pull people away from parties did seem and little imposssible. I was on the phone most of Sunday as well . Can't remember who I had spoke to but it was most of those I had been associated with in antiwar actiicity. But it began to look as if there was little hope of a major public reaction. Coincidentally Tony Lukas's piece on the Council on Foreign Relations revealed that at the same time I was starting this activity that is justaftwr the Yale game. David Rockefeller was getting together with Bill Bundy at the home of President of Harvard Nathan Pusey to offer him the editorship of Foreign Affairs Bundy of course was my colleague at CIS atMIT and had been my associate when the first bombing of Vietnam started in 1964 and 1965. From this time on I wnt into something like full time activity to try to organize protest against the ~~xxx~~ war since I did see a crucial phase approaching. Tuesday Nov. 24th at Noam Chomsky's suggestion we met in the office of Salvador Luria

nobel prize winner in biology at MIT whome I met for the first time. I described to Luria what I saw as Nixon's strategy and he urged me to write that down for the group in the form of a statement that could be signed by other faculty. While we spoke he received a call from a friend who was a correspondent on the Boston Globe who told him that they received no protest in the form of letters with respect to the bombing and suggested that they send a letter. So Luria added this to my guidance that I should put it in the form of a letter. I worked on it that night and the next morning and we met again but I forget whether we met or I read it over the phone to Luria and to Chomsky both of whom agreed to sign it and to distribute it to other faculty members. Either at that same time or before this I had worked to put out an account of what I saw as Nixon's strategy for an MIT student group called SAC for a newsletter they were putting out, and I'd written a long account of Nixon's strategy of residual force plus escalation. Thursday was Thanksgiving and on Wednesday night Chomsky said he would send the letter and our names to the Washington Post not knowing whether they would print it or not. I took the letter with me to New York and on Thanksgiving morning I took it over to the New York Times where the head of the letter section actually came in and read it and said they would run it. They were going to run it on Sunday but for some reason it was delayed until Monday. This led to an embarrassing situation because the Washington Post did accept it and

ran it on Sunday so the Times had already ~~xx~~ set it up and found themselves running it a day after the Post ~~xxxxxx~~ which made them quite furious. They implied that they would be unlikely to run another letter by me.. Letters sent to the times should be sent on an exclusive basis, something which I had not in fact realized. On Saturday I saw Bin back ----- and also I think I had lunch with Wernkey and went over the situation with him.

Nov. 29th I saw Tony Lake with the purpose of making a very strong pitch to him that the time had ~~a~~ come for him to speak out publicly . He had quit Kissinger's staff over Cambodia the first official to resign in protest ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ over Vietnam policy in the 25 years of war. and with him had gone several other people from the staff Roger Morris and a couple of others.. He was one person who could say that he had seen the memoranda . He had seen the cables, the estimates, and it was his conclusion that the policy was as follows. It involved the demonstrations it involved the possibility of escalation into N. Vietnam and that it certainly involved a residual force in S. Vietnam. I told him it did not seem necessary to produce these documents or to quote them directly but what was necessary was that he make it clear to the public that he had this kind of access. Gelb and Halperin in their statements of their interpretations of Nixon's policy had always carefully refrained from drawing attention to the fact that they had had official access to these

precise plans. They said that they had worked in the NSC but made no point of the facts that they were speaking from direct knowledge of planning. and thus their statements had had little more effect than mine. In my own case I had not yet revealed in public that I had so much as worked for Kissinger as a consultant since it would have been embarrassing to Rand for me to do so. in the light of Kissinger's desire ~~for it to be~~ that that be a secret. So I had less authority. It always appeared that I was speaking from knowledge of the Johnson's administration and not at all of the Nixon. whereas the initial conversations with Kissinger included his emphasis on the need for threats of escalation and my knowledge of the options which Kissinger had considered and the information available had given me a good basis for interpreting policies announced by the administration. So I put it to Lake that he was in fact somebody who had had access and who had felt strongly against the war enough to be on the outside now. He was the only one to speak with sufficient authority to be heard on this essential subject. At the same time the point to be made was the crucial point to be made in the politics of the antiwar movement since what was preventing that movement from gaining any momentum or mass ^{support} was the belief that Nixon's policy was something else a policy of total withdrawal a slow one but one which did not contemplate escalation. Thus even people who wished that the withdrawal should be faster were not

to take risks or invest much personal pressure to bring that about. Lake's wife in particular was receptive to what I was saying that I should keep that up but that I should not press too hard on any one occasion. She said this in front of Tony. He was reaching those same conclusion and that she agreed with me.

Tony wanted to think about it and seemed definitely inclined in that direction so I was quite hopeful. He said he was no longer concerned with maintaining a relationship with Kissinger although that had inhibited him at the beginning when he left office. But did not want to seek publicity. He was very concerned by the kiss and tell image and as his wife commented what made life difficult for him was that he did want to be back in the executive branch. One seriously compromised one's chances by any appearance of publicly revealing past lies or inside information. He did say he would be willing to talk to congressmen privately which I set out to bring about but I was doubtful that he would do much more public but he would consider it. I felt it would be a great step forward if he would talk to some of the congressmen who were on the line with respect to the McGovern Hatfield bill. I spoke to some of them the next day trying to set this up. The night of Nov. 30th I had to come back to Harvard for a talk at the Harvard Faculty Club to the Joint Harvard MIT Arms Control seminar chaired by Lincoln Bloomfield to discuss my paper on escalating in a quagmire.. A very well received talk. The first time

I had been exposed to this wide range of professors in the Cambridge area on the subject. I had encouraged the Crimson very strongly to take action on this trying to get the student newspapers to mount an offensive against the escalation and in fact I addressed some time during the next week a meeting of the Crimson editors encouraging them to take various kinds of action which they did. They did arrange with some of the other newspapers but the words from most of the newspapers was that there just wasn't enough interest in this on the campuses. Moreover trying to get something mounted on the campuses as vacation approached seemed difficult. But the Crimson itself at this time did begin printing virtually daily stories on the war and bombing. Thursday there was a teachin at B.U. which I participated in on the war- Dec. 3. I think Cindy Fredericks spoke at that. I was the last speaker and as it ended the police came down the aisle. It was rather an unnerving sight. I thought they had come to arrest me but they just wanted to announce that the meeting had to come to an end because the building had to be closed. On Mond Dec. 7 there was a meeting at the Faculty Club called by Marty Peretz to discuss what faculty might do as a group together to oppose the war. Essentially to institute a group that had worked together after Cambodia, to raise funds for the 1970 campaigns, which in the end had been fought out with almost no mention of the

war as a campaign issue. I spoke to that meeting and the next day I had breakfast with Harry Powen who was at the Ritz Carlton. That may have been the last time I saw Harry. He was there I think to meet with the Rand Trustess. In the afternoon I had my first lunch with Gar Alpervitz, and had a long discussion with him. On Wednesday Dec. 9 I was in Washington for a meeting called Set the Date Committee at the Lutheran Church of the Reformation. This was a set of Church groups that was trying to mount a campaign to bring publicity on the President to cause him to set the date for total withdrawl of U.S. troops. I spoke briefly at that after which the next afternnon I had a talk with Norvyl Jones giving him some suggestions as to what to ask Laird when he appeared before the committee the next morning. The account in notebook is somewhat confusing. During this period I did talk with Jones and he suggested that I come by and attend the hearing which I think was the next day Dec. 10 or it may have been the afternoon Dec. 9 when they gave me a seat in the middle of the hearing room to listen to the testimony. I had given Moose and Jones both a lot of last minute suggestions on thing that Laird should be asked. I had been following previous testimoney very closely and had read it all and put it to them that they should press Laird very very strongly on the issue of his lying in his earlier testimony. I said they should just take his skin off. I said that if they should press him so hard that he was never willing to come back to testify that should be alright.

It was that serious an occasion. They never had him so clearly before in lies. I found myself sitting just behind Laird and to my amazement all the senators treated him with great deference in a conciliatory way so much so that in the end he himself raised the question that he himself had misrepresented the situation to the committee and raising his voice he challenged them to bring out in the open any such charges and instead of rising to that they said, no, no we wouldn't say anything like that! I was astonished. Apparently Fulbright was trying to be conciliatory in a maximum effort to get him to agree to produce certain witnesses about the San Ta raid to testify in front of the committee which he refused to do. But in any case there was no real confrontation at all with Laird. I felt very strongly the desire to rise up myself behind Laird and saying something about obvious lying which he was continuing to do but restrained myself and the next day in the N.Y. Times there was a large photograph taken from behind Fulbright's head so showing Fulbright's head, Laird's face and just behind that my face very clearly and Pat and I were agreeing that this was the only time I would be on the front page of the N.Y. Times. What's confusing is that I would have said that was Dec. 10 but I have here the indication that on Dec. 9 it is possible I had gone back to Cambridge for another meeting of the UNAF, the faculty group and I did discuss at that what had gone on at the Set the Date discussion.

The faculty did not seem inclined to be very active. There was a great deal of talking. Not so much indication of action although there was some talk of a small committee and on action committees and they proposed that I be part of that. Dec. 10 the calendar indicates that was the day I flew with Martin Peretz to have lunch with McCarthy in Washington and to him I put very strongly that the time had come for unusual kinds of actions and for actions of personal commitment by individual senators. I described to him the way I thought the war was going and he agreed entirely. I seemed to me that Congress could be made to accept responsibility for ending the war only if they were pressed by the public and the public in turn would do so if they saw the war as a moral issue since the casualties were declining. It had to be a concern for our intervention, our bombing, for the deaths of Vietnamese that would move the public for to press congress to end the war. McCarthy seemed to feel clearly that the public could not be brought to do this. At one point I put it to him: "Is there no way that we can reduce the probability that the U.S. will burn N. Vietnam to the ground before the next election." McCarthy said "No way" very flatly. I said to him that I thought it might be true. I had a couple of specific suggestions to put to him. 1. that to dramatize to the public that there was almost a million Catholics practicing Catholicism in N. Vietnam under priests and bishops, thus undermining the fear of the Catholic bloodbath might follow a communist

victory. I suggested that he as a Catholic might go to N. Vietnam and make a point of visiting with the Catholic community there and that he might to the same thing in S. Vietnam dramatizing a separate point that the S. Vietnamese catholics had largely come to the desire for peace. They had through various spokesman announced this over the last year or so but without very much attention in this country. He agreed that both of these would be good ideas but was unwilling to do it while he was still a senator in his remaining month or so. He said that he might want to do it during the Spring and he was taken with the thought of holding hearings on Vietnam in the Spring which would be quasi senatorial hearings although by that time he would be out of office. and he wanted me to be in touch. He had incidentally read the notes I had sent him The Strategy for Dissent a year earlier. That is the beginning of 1970. and he also asked to see my paper on the Quagmire. Apparently that afternoon there was another session of the Gelb group at the Brookings institute. I had a note here that I also saw Kennedy in the afternoon of December 10th. which I remember vaguely. I put to him my concerns about escalation. Monday Dec. 14 I was in Washington to be the main speaker at a Press conference called by BEM under Henry Niles and Vinny McGhee. Other speakers at that very friendly were General Shoup who had been the speaker at my graduation at ~~Maxx Mex Sxxhxx~~ Basic Training in the Marine Corp. That morning I later had coffee with

Al Appleby. and for various personal reasons revealed to him somewhat what I was involved in with the Pentagon Papers the prospects for that for the first time but he did not rise to this at all. He had various political concerns of his own and didn't want to be involved at all even the extent of giving me advice. on this subject which I did not describe in any great detail. Tuesday Dec. 15 there was a seminar at MIT in which Ithiel Pool, Harold Isaacs and others described my Quagmire paper to no effect. There was another meeting of the faculty group that evening. Dec. 16 there was a meeting to which I was late because of the taxi strike. The council of foreign relations chaired by the same group that I had addressed, the Osgood group, by William Bundy in which he revealed his version of events in the 60's drawing on obviously a great deal of inside information as the FBI would find if they subpoenaed his paper in addition to mine. I missed a lot of that discussion. I did put it to Bundy that evening as to what he thought the prospects were for renewed bombing of N. Vietnam or the invasion of Laos and he said that the question of public reaction would prevent any such thing. On Dec. 17th I saw Dave McReynolds for the first time for lunch. I had met him briefly at the WRL meeting in Haverford and had read his writings in the Village Voice and knew a number of people who respected him. So I raised the question with him. I described the Pentagon Papers and knowing that he was someone who

believed in direction action and civil disobedience and taken risks of jail himself. Had been in jail I guess. I asked his opinion on what might be done with such materials. Of course by this time I was despairing of getting it out to the foreign relations committee. He in fact did not come up with very much and later to my disappointment he was unable to resist referring to this luncheon in a column written in the Village Voice just after, while, I believe I was underground and before I had take public responsibility for the actions and he referred to the fact that I had mentioned the papers to him. To all such people I took some pains to avoid saying I actually possessed the papers and I discussed them in the terms that it might be possible to reveal them, without committing myself to where they were. Some notes I have here on names remind me that at the end of the year I was interested in the idea of people's committing themselves to some sort of contingency action in case of later escalation. It was clear that the San Te raid and the bombing of N. Vietnam had passed without much reaction. IN fact our letter to the Times and the Post described as hysterical by Phil Guyland in an editorial in the Post, ^{was the only reaction that was printed} in its attribution to President Nixon of a policy that would lead to escalation. Actually Guyland said that clearly his policy was that of getting out. I had the idea of an ad that would put it

to people what do you plan to do when Nixons launched full scale bombing on N. Vietnam or when Nixon invades N. Vietnam.. AT what point do you cross the line? Nixon has told us what his contingency plans are since Nixon by this time had publicly announced that the raid over N. Vietnam would continue under a wide range of contingencies. So he had his planning . If you wait until he carries out these plans you will do nothing if you have made no prior preparation. Think it out now! what it is that you plan to do when next he confronts you with a surprise.. And I put this to a number of people and I remember Chomsky had given me the names of a couple of people in the Boston area who had had similar idea and were talking about contingency for direct actions.. It doesn't show in my notes but either a week before or a week after I had seen McCarthy and I think it was a week before I had had lunch with Goodell at the same restaurant The Monocle and I believe at the same table to make essentially the same proposal to him. It was regrettable that both of them were lame ducks. but on the other hand they were the only two that it seemed to me might take stronger action and to both of them I put the specific proposal of a filibuster even a one man filibuster . Goodell has told me he would be willing to do such a thing if he could find other people to join him.

but that he felt that a one man filibuster would seem like a grand stand play especially since he was a lame duck and especially since he had been repudiated by the voters as he put it. He obviously had lost some self confidence as a result of that action but felt that it would look like a play for publicity. Actually only two senators did vote against the Cambodia supplemental appropriation in december Gore and Goodell. Goodell said that the worst thing that could happen to you in this business is to appear ridiculous. and he was afraid it could have that effect if he acted alone. on that subject. McCarthy did not rise to the idea of a filibuster at all. or of doing anything specific during his lame duck period. Goodell made the specific statement on the question of binding "Dan I hate to say this. The American people does just not care about Vietnamese casualties." He said he had often raised the point in his speeches but he got a dead response. from the audience. I told him that might be true. It certainly was true as things were at the moment It might be impossible to change it but the fact was that the public had not had the lesson put before it of the spectacle of a single authoritative public figure acting as if he believed what a number of them often said that the war was morally wrong and intolerable. That they heard rhetoric and speeches and they saw votes on the McGovern Hatfield bill but they did not see any congressmen actually using the power at his command at some risk to himself.

to obstruct the President's conduct of the war and that could take the form of votes against defence appropriations filibusters, votes against appointments or organized action of the sort one had seen in the Haynesworth and Carswell cases. That was my notion of the only available tactic that might work at this time and throughout the Spring. In front of student audience I had nothing in mind and still don't for that matter that had any promise of success in ending the war but it seemed to me that direct actions and civil disobedience had the potential of persuading a few congressmen who in turn commit themselves in ways that politicians did not do to action and their acts in turn might have an effect on the larger public of drawing their attention to the immorality of the war to its effects on the Vietnamese. That that public reaction might in turn work on other congressmen All of this was extremely tenuous and contingent but it was the only course I could think of that had any promise at all. Thus Pat and I visited the NDAG group Direct Action Group at Harvard of pacifists and talked to others. Some possibility of taking part in various kinds of direct action. nonviolent.

Apparently on Friday night Jan 29 and Sat. Jan 30th and morning of 31st I attended Runnymede conference at Endocott House held by MIT students and a number of business men and friends of Franklin Lindsay and including Tom Winship, Robert Manning, Victor Palmeria This was

the conference at which on Friday evening. Jan. 29 we were addressed by Henry Kissinger and had a long exchange that I have described elsewhere. Kissinger on this occasion it was the last time I saw him apologized to me before the meeting for having raised my name in connection with John Dunn Oberdorfer. I have no note hear but obviously my appearance for the Minnesota Eight in Minnesota was before this sometime in January. Maybe the 10th. It was at that same time that I had a discussion with Oberdorfer in which he told me that Kissinger had revealed that I had been in on the origins of the Nixon Vietnam policy. with the options paper and I so stated in Court. The Runnymede by Kissinger it turned out took place at the preinvasion of Laos. and this led to a strong statement against the bombing. However when a student and I suggested that they make a statement of commitment to refuse support by research by campaign contributions or effort or in another way any candidate ! who was unwilling to support such a statement of ending the bombing and total withdrawal from Vietnam the business men not only refused but were outraged that I had destroyed the spirit of consensus that had been built up at that time. I had not meant to be provocative In fact had felt that such a commitment should have followed naturally. from their strong statements of disapproval of the bombing and it simply seemed to me that actions of commitment versed on the part of citizens and ultimately

on the part of members of Congress were the only path toward ending the war but it seemed these particular men did not reach that decision. That evening I went to dinner at the house of David Greenway of Time to speak to Henry Grinwald the managing editor of Time along with Jim Thompson and Ambassador Reishower. One of the first questions Grinwald asked me was whether we would invade Laos. I answered that the real question was whether we had in fact already invaded Laos despite the Administration's continual denials and subsequently it turned out that the troops had crossed the border into Laos, Vietnamese troops, shortly before we met for dinner. I did speak that evening about Chau's continued arrest and gave a copy of my paper Escalating in a Quagmire to one of Grinwald's assistants. Grinwald later had a haunting memory according to Greenway that I had offered him in effect the Pentagon Papers and that he had somehow failed to accept but I have no such memory. I might have conceivably spoken to him of documents but I certainly made no specific offer. Correction. Dinner with Grinwald took place the night of Feb. 7 and it followed a weekend I had spent at Ann Arbor starting the 5th of the Peace Treaty conferences sponsored by PCPJ and PAC to discuss the People's Peace Treaty operation. I took very little part in that. I had been invited to speak but it turned out that they had no many spokesmen that it wasn't worth trying to get on that program.

I didn't meet many although there were a great many there in whom the FBI had a great interest including John Froines and Rennie Davis. The evening of Feb 6 at the invitation of Cindy Frederick I did address the group of church people at the ecumenical youth center in Ann Arbor and fired them up to take a vigil the next day in front of churches and to pass out a statement which I drafted that night denouncing the continued bombing. After incidentally I had had a long conversation with Oswald Elliot the managing editor of Newsweek the week before at the Runnymede conference. I tried to persuade both Grinwals and Elliot that they should run more pictures showing the effects of our operations on the Vietnamese and on the ecology of Vietnam, pointing out to Elliot that as Messelsohn had informed me Newsweek unlike Time had run pictures of the effects of defoliation coming out of Messelsohn's study but had run them in black and white instead of color. and he agreed that that had been a deliberate decision not to make them more dramatic.

Feb. 8 I was called by Bob Silvers and urged to write a piece for the N. Y. Review of Books on the Nixon policy. and since I had planned to do that for some time although I had intended doing it in a month or two later and since I had done the drafting work on the piece for SACC at MIT. I agreed. Meanwhile Richard Thompson had taken hold of an idea that we had discussed during the evening with Grinwal that there should be a new wave of teach-ins on the campuses as a way of making the war visible

making the war visible to the public putting it in the newspapers again. and he had immediately called a friend of him Greg Kale at Yale and by late Sunday night they already had a notion of a program which they called Rolling Thunder of successive teachins on different campuses . I attended a meeting Tuesday Feb 9 at Harvard shared by Thompson and Marty Peretz to discuss a Harvard teachin which was to be one of the first of these although I expected as one of the people at this early discussion to to be asked to participate in the taachin I was not and I was later told by Thompson the students to him surprise said I sounddd too fanatic on the subject. More extreme than they wanted to present. Wednesday I seemed to have been in Washington. I had dinner with Richard Barnett at his house in which case that would have been the dinner at which we were joined by Stavens and Raskin later on in which they made a heavy pitch to me that the time had come to get the papers out in some fasion. They claimed their book was not coming out probably until the fall so they didn't feel that there was any great pressure on the matter. In any event their book did come out in July I believe but they argued that for political reasons the late Spring was a necessary time for the information to come out. I was impressed by the argument and it refocused me on the specific merits of the papers themselves as an antiwar vehicle. at this point especially because of the Laos invasions. which

made the 1964-5 period seem more relevant than it had earlier. We mentioned the possibility of giving them to a Newspepr like the N. Y. Times and I mantioned that I knew one person on the times Neil Sheehan . They made no comment on this, although subsequently when I spoke to Sheehan he told me that they had been in touch with Sheehan because of his piece on war crimes. The research he had done for the N.Y. Time Magazine section. In retrospect it may be that they were in considerable collusion with Sheehan throughtout the period and as early as this. but in case they did not indicate this that they had spoken to Sheehan at this point. I did come back from that dinner deciding to press ahead either to get action out of Fulbright at last or some other senator. I may be wrong that it was the 10th when this converstaion took place. Its possible that this converstion was in Cambridge at a dinner with Barnett in which I described to him my very unsatisfactory relations with the Institute up to that time. Such a dinner did take place and Franz Sherman was present. It may have been th dinner in which I told him in some detail my dealings with Stavens. in which case the dinner at his house may have taken place somewhat later. Febr. 17 the breakfast took pl ace in Washington which I described earlier by mistake. This was postponed until the 17th. It was the breakdfast when I spoke to the various BEM chapter heads along with General Shoup.

and in which I later had a talk with Al Appleby. In the afternoon the session had been arranged by Bella Abzug that took place at 5.30 in the Congressional building. She had brought together a bunch of liberal congressmen: Art, Dow, Kikva, Ameresk, Rosenthal and some others. I addressed them for about an hour, emphasizing the need for demonstration of commitment by official in full view of the American people of unconventional actions obstructing the President's action conducting the war in Congress. At one point I lost some of Bella Abzug's sympathy by suggesting to her that not everything had been done that could be done to block the war. For example Bella Abzug had not yet chained herself to the White House fence. She took offense to this and said "Do you think that is the best thing I could do" and I tried to explain I had not meant that quite literally, though the suffrage movement had made daily use of that tactic throughout 1917, to considerable effect and that no one had done a comparable action since then. Vinny McGhee was present during this talk and it had slipped my mind that Vinny McGhee himself was facing prison for his non-cooperation with the draft. I had dinner that evening with Representative Eckhardt and his wife from Texas, and I was trying to persuade him to take some actions and in part I was trying to feel him out as a possible person in Congress who might put the PP's into the record, but from the long drawn out discouraging conversation it was clear that he was not ready

he was not ready to do that. He described at one point his feeling that it might be best for the Vietnamese if they were taken over by the communists.

and then said one couldn't possibly say that publicly. and when I tried to presss him to exactly what risks one would run by saying such a thing publicly he was vague

but made it clear that he was not about to make it a test. I was pleased later on after the PP's had come out that he was one of the only one to speak in support of the action and in fact to bring suit against Laird to reveal the PP's officially. A curious event ahappened as Vinie and I left the Eckhardt's in Georgetown on Wisconsin Avenue as we were standing waiting for a cab a red car drove by slowly a hand came out with a water pistol and sprayed my face with liquid which after a moment or two began to stink unbearably . It just happened that the day before I had been in Washington in New York going over Proofs of my N.Y. Review piece with Murray Kempton who had told me about his friend Victor Resell being blinded by acid. This came immediately to my mind. We tried to wash the stuff off but it burned worse than ever . Finally Vinny got me to the hospital where they soaked my face for 45 minutes Finnally concluded that it had been a very strong solution of Pepper water . It did cross my mind that somebody might be tailing me at that point although I knew that was probably not true . The next day Vinny McGhee had set up an appointment for me

at 1.p.m. with a friend of his John Erwin who had formerly been assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs just before the Kennedy administration and now was number 2 man in State having taken over Richardsons' job. I spent the first half hour with him first establishing some rapport on the basis of our ISA association and then telling him about the PP's and the importance in my mind he he assign some people to try to learn some lessons from them. He promised me he would do this and I spoke with his staff man afterward Scott Custar who was to be in charge of this. Nothing was ever done with it although a copy of the papers was at Richardson's office. The Bundy copy of the papers was there. I knew this because Cook when he worked in that suite of offices told me that it was over there despite the disclaimer by the government that they had a copy in State when the papers came out. That afternoon I saw Halperin who was spending some time a month with Common Cause which however, Gardner had decided against continuing. When I was with Halperin we sent over proofs of my N.Y. Review of books piece to the Washington Post for possible use in their Sunday encounter section. but as it turned out they delayed it for another week. because the N.Y. Review wanted to be sure to come out first. At lunch on the 20th I met Tom Wicker had a long lunch to get acquainted. the main purpose of which was to take him to task for some columns he had written in particular one about the Berrigans. which had described the act of

they were accused as viscious . I asked him if he could remember using such a word for the acts of the acts of the officials of which the berrigans were in jail protesting. and he thought hard about that and siad he never had and that was a fair question. We had a discussion of civil disobedience in general and a tendency which he had shown in his own colum to identify any act of c ivil disobedience with violence. I also showed him the proofs of my pœce for the N.Y. REview of Books which led him that very afternoon to write a column entitled a slaughter of innomence which talked almost forthe first time about the impact of the war on the vietnamese and used figures from the Kennedy committee taken from my article which he cited. That appeared I believe on Sunday Feb. 21st. Later he told me that lunch of urs had had even more effect than that indicated on his career since it had led to an invitation to the Harvard Teachin, or he may have had the invitation earlier but led to him to make a stronger speech than he would othewise have made about the moraltiy of the war and that had been a public committment which had exposed him to criticism on the times and somewhat isolated him but which had led him in the direction of toher acts and ultimately to his invovlement at Attica. Meanwhile he ahd sent my article. He had had lunch with McCloskey and had raised the arguments that I had made to him about the impact of the war to McCloskey who subsequently asked to see my article which Wicker sent over so that by the time I met McClosekey he had already read my article.

and was anxious to meet me and talk to me. The Harvard teaching took place Monday Feb. 22. Feb. 24th I was interviewed by Tom Olivant of the Globe and again at 2.00 pm on Feb. 25. In between those times I had a long conversation with Ken O'Donnell in connection with his revelations of Kennedy's attitudes in a Life article which he elaborated on very frankly. The interviews with Olivant were fairly fateful in the course he was asking me how it was that I was the only one who had come out so strongly as I had against the war. He asked me what had changed my mind and I mentioned the McNamara studies and mentioned in passing that only 3 people had read those studies. He asked me who they were and I mentioned Halperin and Gelb. This was a small part of the interview and he picked up on it with great interest it turned out and proceeded to go to Washington to interview both Halperin and Gelb on the issue. Gelb was out of town but he did talk to Halperin which subsequently led to a piece in the Boston Globe with a headline to the effect that 3 men had read a secret study and had turned into doves. The effect was that it was a sort of magic potion to turn someone into a dove, which is not a bad description of the PP's. I have Barnett down for dinner Sunday Feb. 28 and I think that was the day that I had a meal described at this house attended by Stavens and Raskin. That being the case things happened fast after that. I was in town to attend a session of the National War College Monday Mar. 1st. They sent me a first class paid

fare to come to a session chaired by Richard Butwell and also chaired by Joe Sasloff. and General Richard Stillwell who was I think assistant dean of staff of the army. He had formerly been the no. 2 man in Danong and No. 1 in Thailand. I used most of my time in that session to talk about war crimes which was a very provocative subject for that session which consisted of generals and colonels and high officials from state. There was recently a story on the national war college in which they drew attention to the fact that most of their teaching is done by guest lecturers who ranged from X and Y to Daniel Ellsberg. They are not hiding the fact that I addressed them. General Stillwell got into a discussion with me afterwards with me of Truong Tguc Chau and said that he knew my position on this and that he respected my feelings about it although he did not agree with me. I had the feeling of some sympathy on his part the possibility that he had read a large file on me which however placed a lot of emphasis on the Chau episode. One of the interviewers for Ralph Stavens in the institute had been talking to General Peers whom I have never met and who later was the head of the Peers panel on the My Lai atrocity. and asked him some penetrating question to which Peers responded did you get that from Daniel Ellsberg We know all about Ellsberg. Rather an ominous statement implying a file of some sort

Incidentally from what we know now of surveillance during 1968 of various peace activity conducted by the army the likelihood is a dossier began to be collected on me then. if not earlier with the Bermuda statement of 1967.

I think I saw Van in the evening of March 1st and was to see him again the next night. I have various notations for March 2nd but I believe what they add up to is both

McGovern and Mathias on that same day. as well as Gaylord Nelson. By this time my piece had appeared in the N. Y.

Review of Books and also in the Washington Post. I believe that was by Feb. 28th. So I had the long session with McGovern which I have described elsewhere. So of them.

and if it's correct that Mathias was in the same afternoon

The upshot of that was that McGovern said he would use the PP's or give me a final confirmation a few days

later. Mathias on the other hand after a long conversation!

in which he told me his hope was to be the republican spearhead of opposition to the war and the President's policy and that he was anxious to have facts about the current policy to read on the floor of congress

this being protected by the constitution. I went to the foreign relations committee and got the NSSM papers and delivered them to his assistant Sam Goldberg supposedly for the Senators' eyes only. Goldberg was not to read them at all. Although I suppose as practice he would

They were given then in envelopes and sealed to Goldberg's keeping for Mathias who had definitely committed himself

That evening I had dinner with Vinnie McGhee and Fred Branfman who I was meetinf for the first time. We had dinner at the Hay Adams (we had drinks there) where I met them and where we ran into Patricia's sister Barbara and after dinner I went with Branfman to the Francis Key Hotel to to wait for Van, having decided to spend the night with Van. I had not gotten another room and it seemed hard to find one. The Key hotel didn't have a separate room which I wanted. I tried a couple of other hotels which didn't have rooms. We waited quite a while meanwhile talking to Branfman. Finally I decided to call Sheehan whose name had come up two nights before with Barnett. Sheehan invited me over and spent the night talking to Sheehan about the possibilities of the N.Y. Times using the material which he undertook to explore with one or two key people. That would have been March 2 at which time Bob Herstein came up with the name of Jim Vorenberg. I may have talked to Herstein at this time about all the legal implications of what I was doing at that moment although-it doesn't show up in my book. I have a notation of Jim Vorenberg at the Harvard Law School which I take it he gave to me. Wednesday March 10 th I saw apparently Dr. Shader a psychiatrist in Boston for the firs time. I saw him 4 or 5 times. I told him pretty much what Iwas into although he warned me the was subject to subpeona

and he could not exercise privilege in Massachusetts but undertook to take no notes of the conversations. He kept asking me why I had come to see him which had not come apparently in the course of it, in the form of symptoms, and I explained to him that I was involved in things that involved taking great risks with my future in would involve my family and a lot of other people and that I wanted to have a chance to talk through my motives as they seemed to me and my feelings about it to sort out as best I could and try to sort out if my actions were ^{understood by} ~~understood~~ my motives of which I was not conscious. I didn't see him after the PP's actually came out.

On Fri. March 12 I participated in a teaching at Kresge auditorium. The next day Halperin was meeting Reinshower to try to put together a committee to work against the war a permanent organization. This was a dream of Halperin's. It had been for over a year. Apparently I discussed with him the afternoon the first the fact that his association with Gardner had fallen through and Gardner had decided against using Common Cause to press against the war. That meant immediately to me that Mathias was unlikely to go ahead with what he was doing. In fact he might not do it without backing from Garner. Halperin that afternoon Sat. March 13 raised the fact that I had talked to Mathias and said that Mathias had indicated that I had in mind doing something reckless and Halperin said that I should not that I might reveal

some information I was noncommittal on that at that point . Specific mention was made of the PP's

It may have been on Sunday March 14 That I saw Boudin for the first time since our meeting of a year earlier Boudin's partner has just walked in the room.!!